Is Gaza Occupied?:  Redefining the Status of Gaza Under International Law by Samson, Elizabeth
American University International Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 5 Article 4
2010
Is Gaza Occupied?: Redefining the Status of Gaza
Under International Law
Elizabeth Samson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Samson, Elizabeth. "Is Gaza Occupied?: Redefining the Status of Gaza Under International Law."American University International
Law Review 25 no. 5 (2010): 915-967.
 
915 
IS GAZA OCCUPIED?:  
REDEFINING THE STATUS OF GAZA UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ELIZABETH SAMSON∗ 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 916 
I. A BRIEF POLITICAL AND TERRITORIAL HISTORY OF 
GAZA ........................................................................................ 919 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATIVE TO THE 
RELATIONSHIP OF ISRAEL AND GAZA ............................ 923 
A. SOURCES OF OCCUPATION LAW AND “EFFECTIVE 
CONTROL” ............................................................................ 923 
B. LEGALITY OF THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND 
THE PALESTINIANS ............................................................... 926 
III. OCCUPATION OF GAZA AND THE ARGUMENTS FOR 
“EFFECTIVE CONTROL” ....................................................... 931 
IV. DISMANTLING THE ARGUMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE 
CONTROL ................................................................................ 935 
A. AUTHORITY OVER GAZA’S TERRITORIAL WATERS AND 
AIRSPACE ............................................................................. 935 
1. Territorial Waters ............................................................ 936 
2. Airspace ........................................................................... 937 
B. THE BORDER BETWEEN ISRAEL AND GAZA .......................... 940 
1. Borders and International Law ........................................ 940 
2. The Crossings .................................................................. 942 
C. GAZA’S INFRASTRUCTURE ..................................................... 947 
1. Electricity, Fuel, and Telecommunications ................... 947 
 
∗ Visiting Fellow, Hudson Institute. J.D. Fordham Law School; LL.M. 
International and European Law, University of Amsterdam.  The research for this 
article was made possible through the support of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center 
for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University in Israel where the author served as 
Research Associate during the writing of this article.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Efraim Inbar of Bar-Ilan University for his guidance and Isaac 
Glovinsky of Fordham Law School for his invaluable research assistance.  
916 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:915 
2. Water Supply and Sewage Removal ............................. 950 
D. TAXATION AND POPULATION REGISTRY IN GAZA ................ 952 
1. Taxation ......................................................................... 952 
2. Population Registry ....................................................... 954 
E. ISRAEL’S SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND RIGHT TO RE-
ENTER GAZA ......................................................................... 956 
F. ISRAEL’S “ABILITY” TO EXERCISE POWER OVER GAZA ........ 958 
V. CHANGING THE STATUS OF GAZA ................................... 961 
A. AN END TO OCCUPATION AND A NEW BEGINNING ............... 962 
B. THE TRANSITION OF GAZA FROM OCCUPIED TO SUI 
GENERIS TERRITORY ............................................................. 963 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 965 
INTRODUCTION 
Many attempts have been made over the years to resolve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict by setting terms upon which both parties 
can agree. Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) 
entered into several agreements since 1993 which were all designed 
to advance the process of transitioning the occupied territories to 
autonomous rule while taking into account Israel’s national security 
concerns. Despite these efforts there has been a political deadlock, 
particularly since the commencement of the Second Intifada—or 
Palestinian Uprising—in 2000. With security breaches increasing 
beginning in 2000 and an escalation of attacks on the Israeli civilian 
population emanating from the Gaza Strip,1 the Israeli Cabinet 
decided in 2004 to disengage from Gaza with the specific intent to no 
longer occupy the territory.2 
On September 12, 2005, the last Israeli soldier left the Gaza Strip 
and there has been no official Israeli military or civilian presence in 
the territory since then. Nonetheless, the United Nations has been 
reluctant to accept that Gaza is no longer occupied, with a 
spokesman for U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon declaring in 
 
 1. This article uses the names ‘Gaza’ and ‘Gaza Strip’ interchangeably. 
 2. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Aff., The Disengagement Plan - General 
Outline, Apr. 18, 2004, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Disengagemen
t+Plan+-+General+Outline.htm [hereinafter The Disengagement Plan] (expressing 
concerns over the lack of a reliable Palestinian partner as the basis for unilateral 
disengagement). 
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January 2009 that “the U.N. defines Gaza, the West Bank, and East 
Jerusalem as occupied Palestinian territory. No, that definition hasn’t 
changed.”3 
This article explores the definition of “occupied territory” under 
international law and contends that the term “occupied territory” no 
longer applies to Gaza after Israel’s disengagement. Although the 
United Nations still maintains that Gaza is occupied, under both the 
literal and interpreted applications of the definition of occupation—
characterized by what is termed “effective control”—Gaza is not 
occupied territory pursuant to the standards set forth in international 
law and doctrine. 
While this article will make mention of the viewpoints about 
whether Israel has, indeed, been an occupying power under 
international law, the intent of the research is not to dispute the long-
accepted assertion in the international community, which has also 
been supported by judicial decisions of Israel’s own Supreme Court, 
that Gaza has been considered occupied. In dealing with that reality 
as it is, the article seeks to provide a comprehensive legal analysis to 
establish that, despite whatever previous classifications have been 
applied to Gaza, Gaza is presently not an occupied territory.  
The purposes of this article are: (1) to establish that Israel 
presently does not exercise “effective control” over Gaza and, 
therefore, does not occupy it, and in doing so (2) to provide a 
comprehensive analysis to lay the groundwork to redefine the official 
status of Gaza as a “sui generis territory” for the intermediate period 
between the previous Palestinian occupation and any prospective 
future statehood. 
The existence of an Israeli presence in Gaza has been used by 
Palestinians living in the territory to justify attacks against Israel. As 
a consequence of the attacks that have emanated from Gaza, Israel 
withdrew from the territory in order to end its legal obligations as an 
occupier of Gaza. Gaza’s status as a “sui generis territory” will 
eliminate the existence of the occupation of Gaza as a justification 
for attacks that are initiated against Israel. It will also consequently 
 
 3. Benny Avni, The O Word: Is Gaza Occupied Territory?, N.Y. SUN, Feb.11, 
2008, http://www.nysun.com/foreign/o-word-is-gaza-occupied-territory/71079/ 
(last visited June 20, 2010). 
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provide greater legitimacy for Israel’s acts of self-defense against 
hostile terrorist networks that use Gaza as a base for their operations. 
It is therefore imperative that the official legal status of Gaza be 
changed. The analysis in this article will combine a practical and a 
legal approach that will strengthen the political argument in support 
of that change, while recognizing the legal implications and 
identifying the need for a political solution. 
Part I provides the historical backdrop against which the 
contemporary situation in Gaza should be analyzed. This Part traces 
the history of Gaza from Biblical times until the Israeli 
disengagement in 2005. 
Part II examines the legal sources that are relevant to this paper. 
The first subpart addresses the sources of occupation in international 
law and defines the term “effective control” as the standard for 
determining the existence of an occupation. As many arguments 
throughout this paper are dependent on the premise that the several 
agreements that Israel and the Palestinian Authority have signed are 
binding under international law, the second subpart makes the 
argument that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides the authority to assert that agreements between states and 
non-state actors or “other subjects of international law” have the 
same force as treaties and are therefore binding. The U.N. Security 
Council, reflecting the impression of the international community 
that the agreements are binding, has called upon the parties to 
implement them. 
Part III establishes that, despite disagreement about whether Gaza 
has ever been occupied, Israel’s courts have supported the notion that 
Israel has, indeed, been an occupier. In order to make the argument 
that Gaza’s status must be changed from that of an occupied 
territory, it is necessary to recognize that the territory had been 
occupied in the past. This Part puts forth the various assertions that 
have been made as to why Israel is still exercising “effective control” 
over Gaza and why the occupation persists, even after 
disengagement. Additionally, this Part lays out a three-part “effective 
control” test, which will be the benchmark against which each of the 
assertions will be measured. 
Part IV systematically dismantles each of the assertions regarding 
“effective control” from the previous Part. By combining legal 
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analysis and interpretation with an examination of the facts, the 
subparts assess the arguments relating to each assertion and explain 
why they fail the “effective control” test outlined in Part III. 
Part V explores the ways to end an occupation and determines the 
absence of “effective control” over Gaza as a legally sufficient 
indication that occupation has officially ended. Furthermore, that 
element combined with the existence of the Palestinian Authority as 
the indigenous government endorsed by the population which is 
recognized by the international community lends additional weight to 
the conclusion that occupation is over. As occupation of Gaza is 
determined by this analysis to have ended, the paper posits that the 
new legal status of Gaza should be that of a “sui generis territory” 
administered by the Palestinian Authority. 
This article concludes with a recommendation that Gaza should 
have a new intermediate legal status—”sui generis territory”—as a 
positive step towards relieving Israel of the obligations of an 
occupier while moving the Palestinian people in the direction of 
complete autonomy, which will lay the groundwork for the 
establishment of a Palestinian state that will exist peacefully beside 
Israel. 
I. A BRIEF POLITICAL AND TERRITORIAL 
HISTORY OF GAZA 
The Gaza Strip, a coastal territory along the Mediterranean Sea 
bordered by Israel and Egypt, is internationally recognized as part of 
the Palestinian Territories.4 The first historic mention of Gaza is in 
the Hebrew Bible: “The . . . Canaanite territory extended from Sidon 
as far as Gerar, near Gaza . . . .”5 Gaza is mentioned again around the 
fifteenth century B.C., in connection with Samson whose story is 
inextricably linked with Gaza.6 Samson was delivered into bondage 
in Gaza by Delilah, and he died toppling the Temple of the god 
Dagon as revenge on the Philistines for gouging out his eyes.7 Gaza 
 
 4. See MARTIN GILBERT, ISRAEL: A HISTORY 491-92 (William Morrow 1998) 
(1936) (noting that the Camp David Accords suggested an independence plan for 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, further confirming acceptance of a Palestinian 
identity). 
 5. Genesis 10:19. 
 6. Judges 16:25-30. 
 7. Id. 
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was mentioned again in the story of the prophet Amos, who 
condemned the people of Gaza for trading in slaves and told its 
people that they had sinned and that God would bring fire upon the 
city walls.8 
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the Crusaders contested and 
sometimes controlled Gaza.9 In 1517 the Ottoman Empire conquered 
the territory,10 but Ottoman rule over Gaza was interrupted in 1799 
when the Middle East was temporarily conquered by Napoleon’s 
invading armies.11 After the turn of the century, Mohammed Ali, 
known as the founder of modern Egypt, expanded his power to 
territories beyond Egypt including Sudan and Syria.12 This event is 
significant because it marks the beginning of modern Egypt’s 
influence over Gaza. Later recaptured by the Ottoman Empire, the 
Ottomans permanently lost Palestine to the British during World War 
I in the Third Battle of Gaza in 1917.13 After the war, Gaza became 
part of the British Mandate of Palestine in 1922 under the authority 
of the League of Nations.14 The territory remained under British 
mandatory control until the dissolution of the Mandate of Palestine in 
May of 1948.15 
 
 8. See Amos 1:6; see also THE JEWISH PUBLICATION SOCIETY, TANAKH: A 
NEW TRANSLATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ACCORDING TO THE TRADITIONAL 
HEBREW TEXT 16, 405-07, 1015-16 (1985). 
 9. See NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A HISTORY 358 (1996) (briefing the 
Crusaders seven major attempts to recover the Holy Land between 1096 and 
1291). 
 10. See ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 86 (1991) 
(elaborating on the success of the Ottoman Empire and its absorption of Syria, 
Egypt, and Western Arabia). 
 11. See id. at 265 (noting this interruption of the Ottoman control by the French 
armies as marking a new era regarding military power). 
 12. See id. at 273 (describing how Ali rallied the support of the townspeople 
and imposed a new ruling group). 
 13. See id. at 318 (specifying that after the end of World War I, the British 
Balfour Declaration and Treaty of Versailles subjected the Ottoman controlled 
territories of Iraq and Palestine to British Mandate). 
 14. See GILBERT, supra note 4, at 42 (remarking that the Paris Peace 
Conference both granted the Palestine Mandate to Britain and “accept[ed] the 
promise of the Balfour Declaration to ‘facilitate’ the establishment of Jewish 
National Home there”). 
 15. See id. at 186 (detailing Israel’s inaugural ceremony, the signing of the 
Israeli Declaration of Independence, and the exit of the British troops and 
administration). 
2010] IS GAZA OCCUPIED? 921 
On the eve of Israel’s independence in November 1947, the United 
Nations issued a Partition Plan for Palestine16 which recommended 
dividing the remaining territories of the Mandate of Palestine into 
two states, one Jewish and one Arab, with Gaza becoming part of the 
Arab state.17 The Jewish authorities in Palestine accepted the U.N.’s 
plan, while Arab representatives in Palestine, as well as the Arab 
states, rejected it. After Israel declared its independence in May 
1948, the Egyptian army invaded the area from the south, thus 
commencing Israel’s War of Independence. That event was followed 
by invasions from the other neighboring Arab countries of Jordan, 
Syria and Lebanon.18 
The territory of the Gaza Strip as it is now known was the product 
of the subsequent 1949 Armistice Agreement between Egypt and 
Israel.19 The Agreement established that the border of the Gaza Strip 
 
 16. See G.A. Res. 181 (II), § A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/181 (Nov. 29, 1947). 
 17. See id. § B, pt. I(A) (detailing the termination of the Mandate, the gradual 
withdrawal of armed forces, and the creation of two independent states in the 
territory). Article 10 of the U.N. Charter, however, only allows the General 
Assembly to discuss any matter within the ambit of the U.N. terms of reference 
and to make recommendations, but not binding decisions. Only the Security 
Council can make binding decisions. U.N. Charter art. 10. 
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the 
scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any 
organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 
12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to 
the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters. 
Id. 
 18. See generally GILBERT, supra note 4, at 186-208 (providing a historical 
account of the events leading up to and occurring during the Israeli War of 
Independence). 
 19. The 1949 Armistice Agreements are a set of agreements negotiated 
bilaterally between Israel and its neighbors—Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria—
that ended the official hostilities of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (1947-1949) and 
established respective demarcation lines. These armistice agreements have not 
been superseded by an authentic peace treaty, with the exception of the treaty 
between Israel and Egypt. See General Armistice Agreement, Isr.-Egypt, Feb. 24, 
1949, arts. II, V, VI, 42 U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Isr.-Egypt Armistice]; General 
Armistice Agreement, Isr.-Leb., Mar. 23, 1949, arts. I-V, 42 U.N.T.S. 287; Israel-
Jordan Armistice Agreement, Isr.-Jordan, Apr. 3, 1949, arts. I, IV-V, 42 U.N.T.S. 
303; General Armistice Agreement, Isr.-Syria, July 20, 1949, arts. I, III, V, 42 
U.N.T.S. 327. Pursuant to these agreements, the Security Council on August 11, 
1949 issued a Resolution that, inter alia, “noted with satisfaction the several 
Armistice Agreements” and found “that the Armistice Agreements constitute[d] an 
important step toward the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine and 
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was “dictated exclusively by military considerations” and was “valid 
only for the period of the Armistice” without “establish[ing], . . . 
recogniz[ing], . . . strengthen[ing], . . . weaken[ing] or nullify[ing], in 
any way, any territorial, custodial or other rights, claims or interests 
which may be asserted by either Party in the area of Palestine.”20 
Egypt imposed a military government on Gaza in the 1950s and 
1960s,21 but never purported to annex it. In June 1967, as a 
consequence of the Six-Day War, Israel gained control of Gaza, and 
the Israeli military—the Israel Defense Forces (“IDF”)—remained 
the authority in Gaza until 1994.22 On September 13, 1993, Israel and 
the PLO signed the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements (“Oslo Accords”)23 leading to the transfer 
of governmental authority to a newly established Palestinian 
Authority the next year. After the signing, most of Gaza, with the 
exception of the Israeli settlement blocs and military areas, came 
under Palestinian control.24  
As a consequence of the Second Intifada which erupted in 
September 2000 and wreaked havoc on Israel for several years with 
rocket attacks and suicide bombings from Gaza (as well as the West 
Bank) at the direction of Fatah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the Israeli 
government voted in February 2005 to unilaterally disengage from 
 
consider[ed] that these agreements supersede the truce provided for in Security 
Council resolutions 50 (1948) of 29 May and 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948.” G.A. 
Res. 73, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/73 (Aug. 11, 1949). 
 20. Isr.-Egypt Armistice, supra note 19, art. IV.3. 
 21. GILBERT, supra note 4, at 329-31. 
 22. See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Aff., Israel’s Disengagement Plan: 
Renewing the Peace Process, Apr. 20, 2005, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israels
+Disengagement+Plan-+Renewing+the+Peace+Process+Apr+2005.htm 
[hereinafter Israel’s Disengagement Plan] (explaining that the Six Day War also 
resulted in Israel’s control over the West Bank). 
 23. See Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self Government Arrangements, pmbl., Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525, 
1527 [hereinafter Oslo Accords] (recognizing the need to end conflict and create 
peaceful coexistence). 
 24. In September 1995, Israel and the PLO signed a second peace agreement, 
known as Oslo II, which extended the Palestinian Authority to most West Bank 
towns. The agreement also established an elected 88-member Palestinian National 
Council, which held its inaugural session in Gaza in March 1996. Israel-Palestine 
Liberation Organization: Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
With Selected Annexes, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 [hereinafter Oslo II]. 
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the territory.25 The Disengagement Plan stipulated that all Israeli 
settlements in Gaza and the Israeli-Palestinian Erez Industrial Zone 
should be dismantled, military bases be removed, and all 9,000 
Israeli settlers be relocated from Gaza.26 
So the question remains: if Israel has withdrawn from Gaza and 
the Israeli cabinet formally declared an end to Israeli military rule in 
the Gaza Strip in September 2005, why is the territory still 
considered occupied? 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATIVE TO THE 
RELATIONSHIP OF ISRAEL AND GAZA 
A. SOURCES OF OCCUPATION LAW AND “EFFECTIVE CONTROL” 
The laws of occupation are derived from two primary sources: the 
regulations annexed to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (“Hague 
Regulations”)27 and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (“Fourth 
Geneva Convention”).28 
The Hague Regulations codified the rules of customary 
international law on armed conflict and addressed international 
occupation law in Section III entitled, “Military Authority over the 
 
 25. See Israel’s Disengagement Plan, supra note 22 (noting that the 
disengagement plan could lead to renewed peace talks). It must be noted that 
disengagement is not a unilateral attempt to change Gaza’s formal legal status, an 
act that is prohibited by the various agreements between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority. See infra Part V. 
 26. See id. (outlining the key provisions and timeline of the unilateral 
disengagement plan). 
 27. See Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Law and Customs of War 
on Land and its Annex: Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, July 29, 1899, arts. 23, 42-43, 187 Consol. T.S. 429 (banning the use of 
certain types of modern technology in war); Hague Convention (IV) Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631, 
205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations] (expanding upon the 1899 
Convention).  
 28. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 2-3, 6, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth 
Geneva Convention] (asserting the Convention’s application to occupying powers 
and delineating the restrictions on the exertion of their control). 
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Territory of the Hostile State.”29 The laws address what would 
happen after hostilities end and an occupation begins. They also deal 
with various aspects of occupation from its commencement to the 
responsibilities of the occupier, as well as limitations on the 
occupier’s behavior. 
The Hague Conventions and the annexed Hague Regulations were 
drafted in a time when wars were primarily fought by soldiers in a 
combat zone. That dynamic changed during the two World Wars 
because new tactics were used that directly affected civilian 
populations.30 In addressing the changes on the battlefield, the Fourth 
Geneva Convention was written to supplement the Hague 
Regulations by filling in the areas in which the Hague Regulations 
fell short with respect to civilians.31 The Fourth Geneva Convention 
included provisions regulating the behavior of states towards civilian 
populations during wartime, and further delineated states’ obligations 
to civilians in the event of an occupation.32 Some of the obligations 
in occupied territories outlined in the Fourth Geneva Convention 
include: 
 
 29. Hague Regulations, supra note 27, § 3. 
 30. See Nicholas F. Lancaster, Occupation Law, Sovereignty, and Political 
Transformation: Should the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention Still be Considered Customary International Law?, 189 MIL. L. REV. 
51, 55-57 (2006) (discussing the Convention drafters’ intent to create provisions 
aimed at preventing the suffering of civilian populations affected by war); ALLEN 
GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1978) (remarking 
that occupants often desire to reform the occupied territory). Occupants are 
restricted in the nature of the changes that they wish to make in that “[i]t is widely 
acknowledged that the occupant must not institute in the occupied territory far-
reaching constitutional modifications.” Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of 
Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights, 8 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 104, 113 
(1978). 
 31. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art. 154. 
In the relations between the Powers who are bound by The Hague 
Conventions respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, whether that 
of 29 July, 1899, or that of 18 October, 1907, and who are parties to the 
present Convention, this last Convention shall be supplementary to Sections II 
and III of the Regulations annexed to the above-mentioned Conventions of 
The Hague. 
Id. 
Additionally, Section II of the Hague Regulations relates to “Hostilities” and 
Section III relates to “Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State.” 
Hague Regulations, supra note 27, §§ II-III. 
 32. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 28, arts. 55-57. 
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• Protecting children and providing facilities for their care 
and education, as well as taking any necessary measures 
to help identify children, to assist orphaned children, and 
to provide preferential treatment to “children under than 
fifteen years, expectant mothers, and mothers of children 
under seven years”;33 
• Providing food and medical care and ensuring sufficient 
hygiene and public health standards;34 
• Allowing humanitarian aid shipments such as food, 
clothing and medical supplies for the benefit of the 
population and facilitating the accessibility of such 
shipments;35 and 
• Prohibiting destruction of any property unless “absolutely 
necessary” to the military operation.36  
Notwithstanding these obligations, the Fourth Geneva Convention 
makes little mention of the geographic reach of the responsibilities of 
an occupying force. The Hague Regulations vaguely address the 
issue of scope by stating that occupation exists only in areas where 
authority is “established” and “can be exercised.”37 
Beyond these two sources, international law provides little 
guidance as to what constitutes an occupation. However, the term 
“effective control” is consistently applied in the case law and state 
practice to assess the exercise of authority in a territory and, 
therefore, the existence of an occupation. In the context of 
international occupation law, “effective control” is a term of art with 
no definite source, but it has developed as the standard that combines 
the conditions for occupation outlined in the Hague Regulations and 
the Fourth Geneva Convention. Article 42 of the Hague Regulations 
states that “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed 
under the authority of the hostile army” and that “[t]he occupation 
extends only to the territory where such authority has been 
 
 33. Id. art. 50. 
 34. Id. arts. 55-56. 
 35. Id. art. 59 (specifying that aid from “either . . . States or . . . impartial 
humanitarian organizations” would be acceptable). 
 36. Id. art. 53. 
 37. See Hague Regulations, supra note 27, art. 42. 
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established and can be exercised.”38 Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention merely describes the legal duties of an occupier as 
existing only to the extent that the state in power “exercises the 
functions of government in such [occupied] territory.”39 
To expand upon those requirements, the case of United States v. 
List (“Hostages Case”)40 before the United States Military Tribunal 
at Nuremburg after World War II provides legal precedent for a more 
comprehensive interpretation. The tribunal held that the established 
government of the territory must be fully replaced by the occupier in 
order for occupation to obtain: 
[A]n occupation indicates the exercise of governmental 
authority to the exclusion of the established government. This 
presupposes the destruction of organized resistance and the 
establishment of an administration to preserve law and order. 
To the extent that the occupant’s control is maintained and 
that of the civil government eliminated, the area will be said 
to be occupied.41 
As there are no precise guidelines for what “effective control” 
entails, determining what actually constitutes “effective control” is a 
complex analysis of the facts on the ground as well as the laws 
applicable to each circumstance. Furthermore, Gaza’s territorial 
status as a non-state does not allow for a more simple application of 
the relevant international laws. This article addresses both of these 
challenges in later Parts. 
B. LEGALITY OF THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE 
PALESTINIANS 
The purpose of the 1907 Hague Convention was to establish 
agreements to reduce suffering caused by future wars and to codify 
the rules of warfare in the event that a war could not be prevented; 
 
 38. Id. art. 42. 
 39. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art. 6. 
 40. United States v. List (Hostages Case), U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, 
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, VOL. 6-10, at 55-56 (William S. 
Hein 1997) (1948) [hereinafter Hostages Case]. 
 41. Id.; see also Yuval Shany, Faraway, So Close: The Legal Status of Gaza 
After Israel’s Disengagement, 8 Y.B. INT’L. HUM. L. 1, 11 (2006) [hereinafter 
Shany, Faraway, So Close] (summarizing the three stages of occupation implied 
by the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention). 
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the intention was to maintain state sovereignty even after defeat.42 
Despite defeat, the losing state retained sovereignty and the right to 
return to a peaceful state and the status quo ante unless the 
conquering state annexed the territory.43 While Gaza’s status quo 
ante was that of administered territory and not statehood, in this 
context the notion can be taken to mean a return to a peaceful 
condition characterized by the establishment of self-government in 
some form. Recognizing the importance of these principles and that 
the ultimate objective of an occupation is to enable the territory that 
is occupied to eventually self-govern and live peacefully with its 
neighbors, Israel entered into several bilateral agreements with the 
PLO to facilitate a transfer of power to the Palestinian Authority.44  
According to Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
protected persons may not be deprived “of the benefits of the . . . 
Convention by any . . . agreement concluded between the authorities 
of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power.”45 In light of 
this provision, some contend that the Israel’s bilateral agreements 
with the PLO amount only to self-administration agreements 
between the occupier and the local authorities in the occupied 
territories. Such contentions are easily dispelled by the preamble to 
the Oslo Accords, which states: 
 
 42. See Lancaster, supra note 30, at 53 (adding that “the convention was a 
product of its times, where states fought mainly limited wars with minimal impact 
on civilian populations”). 
 43. See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 11 
(1993) (highlighting the difficulties of the restoration process in times of 
occupation, and remarking that that process is often the source of many of those 
difficulties). 
 44. See, e.g., Oslo Accords, supra note 23 (encompassing one such bilateral 
agreement between Israel and the PLO). The agreements mentioned throughout 
this piece have been included as they pertain to Gaza. Another agreement, the 
Hebron Protocol, was not included as it makes no mention of Gaza and is not 
relevant to the subject matter of this paper. Israel Ministry of Foreign Aff., 
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Jan. 17, 1997, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Protoco
l+Concerning+the+Redeployment+in+Hebron.htm [hereinafter Hebron Protocol] 
 45. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art. 47; see alsoYuval Shany, 
Binary Law Meets Complex Reality: The Occupation of Gaza Debate, 41 ISR. L. 
REV. 68, 73-74 (2006) (identifying a “binary normative configuration” in the 
application of certain fields of international law in which international law will 
apply only where preceded by a certain set of factual circumstances, and remarking 
that the law of occupation is one such field of law). 
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The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team . . . 
representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put 
an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize 
their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live 
in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and 
achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement 
and historic reconciliation through the agreed political 
process.46 
The purpose of the Oslo Accords, essentially the foundation 
document for all agreements to come, was not to delimit the rights of 
an occupied people, but rather to begin to move the two entities 
forward in a process that would lead to peace and security and to 
create terms upon which both parties could rely with regard to their 
respective responsibilities. 
The Oslo Accords laid the groundwork for Israel’s transfer of 
control over parts of the West Bank and Gaza to the newly created 
Palestinian Authority, which would be responsible for administering 
the territory under its own rule. The Oslo Accords also provided for 
the future negotiation of an interim agreement to settle many of the 
details of responsibility and transfer of powers that were not covered 
therein.47 The Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement on 
the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area of 1994 (“Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement”) was concluded as a follow-up to the Oslo Accords and 
provided many of the particulars relating to the responsibilities of 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority.48  
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement was eventually superseded by 
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip (“Oslo II”).49 Oslo II was concluded in 1995 and provided 
the details for the establishment of the Palestinian Council, including 
its structure, its powers, its responsibilities, and the transfer of 
 
 46. Oslo Accords, supra note 23, intro. 
 47. Id. art. 7. 
 48. See Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strip 
and the Jericho Area, May, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 622, 626-28 [hereinafter Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement] (establishing provisions for the withdrawal of Israeli military forces 
and the transfer of authority to the Palestinian Authority). 
 49. See Oslo II, supra note 24, pmbl. (asserting expressly that the previous 
three agreements, including the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, would “be superseded by 
this Agreement”). 
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authority to the Council.50 Among other items, Oslo II also contained 
provisions relating to redeployment of Israeli military forces and 
security arrangements for Israel.51 
Two later agreements, the Wye River Memorandum of 1998 
(“Wye River Memo”)52 and the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum of 
1999 (“Sharm el-Sheikh Memo”),53 were concluded with the purpose 
of implementing Oslo II. The Sharm el-Sheikh Memo was also 
intended to implement all the other “prior agreements” between 
Israel and the Palestinians since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 
September 1993.54 
The strength of the arguments to be made in this article depends 
upon the assumption that these agreements are legally binding under 
international law. Because the PLO is not the government of a 
sovereign state, questions have been raised as to whether the 
agreements are binding since they were not “concluded between 
States” as required by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“VCLT”).55 However, the absence of statehood of one or both 
parties to an agreement does not entirely diminish either party’s 
responsibilities under international law. The VCLT states: “The fact 
that the present Convention does not apply to international 
agreements concluded between States and other subjects of 
international law or between such other subjects of international 
law . . . shall not affect . . . [t]he legal force of such agreements.”56 
An agreement between Israel and the Palestinians may not be 
 
 50. Oslo II, supra note 24, arts. 1-12, 31. 
 51. Id. arts. 10-14. 
 52. Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Wye River Memorandum (Interim 
Agreement), Oct. 23, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1251, 1251 [hereinafter Wye River Memo]. 
 53. Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: The Sharm el-Sheikh 
Memorandum, Sept 4, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1465, 1465 [hereinafter Sharm el-Sheikh 
Memo]. 
 54. See id. (prefacing the memo by stating that nothing contained therein would 
undermine any prior agreements between Israel and Palestine). 
 55. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“‘[T]reaty’ means an international agreement concluded 
between States in written form and governed by international law, whether 
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
whatever its particular designation.”). 
 56. Id. art. 3 (emphasis added). 
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permitted the formal title of a treaty under the VCLT, but the 
agreements have the potential to be enforced nonetheless.57 
It has also been contended that the Oslo Accords and its 
subsequent agreements are no longer relevant due to failure of 
implementation. However, just as the VCLT applies to any 
international treaty between states parties, failure of implementation 
does not automatically nullify an agreement between a state and 
another subject of international law and does not lessen its weight. 
Remedies for breach of the agreements are also covered by Article 3 
of the VCLT.58 The failure to implement the agreements allows the 
aggrieved party to invoke the same remedies for breach as under the 
VCLT: “terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole 
or in part.”59 While the right of termination is available to both Israel 
and the Palestinians, neither party has exercised that right. 
That the agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
are perceived as binding is also evidenced by the fact that the U.N. 
Security Council, reflecting the sentiments of the international 
community, has urged the parties on several occasions to implement 
their terms.60 The Security Council issued a resolution in 1994 to 
encourage the “implementation of the declaration of principles . . . 
without delay,”61 and in 1996 the Security Council “urg[ed] the 
 
 57. See generally GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS 57-74 
(2000) (delineating the arguments regarding the enforceability of the Oslo Accords 
as treaties, such as the fact that the original version of the VCLT referenced 
agreements encompassing non-state parties, and remarking that the “nomenclature 
adopted by the parties . . . or the press” (“agreement” as opposed to “treaty”) is not 
dispositive). 
 58. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 55, art 3. Article 3 
of the VCLT is entitled “International agreements not within the scope of the 
present Convention,” and states:  
The fact that the present Convention does not apply to international 
agreements concluded between States and other subjects of international law . 
. . shall not affect . . . the application to them of any of the rules set forth in 
the present Convention to which they would be subject under international 
law independently of the Convention.  
Id. 
 59. Id. art. 60(1). 
 60. John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are they Treaties?, 30 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 717, 738 (1997). 
 61. Id. (quoting S.C. Res. 904, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3351st mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/904 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 548 (1994)). 
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parties to fulfill their obligations, including the agreements they 
reached.”62 And as recently as June 26, 2009, the Quartet on the 
Middle East—four entities involved in mediating the peace process: 
United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations—
called upon Israel and the Palestinians to implement their 
obligations.63 All of these efforts indicate that the United Nations 
sees the agreements as binding in that the agreements have created 
responsibilities for both parties that need to be enforced.64 
The ability to execute the agreements between Israel and the 
Palestinians remains a challenge, but the provisions that both parties 
continue to uphold, particularly the ones that are pertinent to the 
arguments here, still apply. The agreements may not prove to serve 
as a direct path to peace for Israel and statehood for the Palestinian 
people, but the contracts that they created and the rights that they 
granted to the parties endure, insofar as both parties act in good 
faith.65 
III. OCCUPATION OF GAZA AND THE 
ARGUMENTS FOR “EFFECTIVE CONTROL” 
The international law of occupation as applied to the situation in 
the Palestinian Territories has often been questioned. Under Israel’s 
interpretation, the occupation provisions of the Hague Regulations 
and the Fourth Geneva Convention refer only to territories of “High 
Contracting Parties,” i.e., states parties to the treaties. Indeed, the 
international law of occupation has traditionally been understood to 
only apply to the relationships between sovereign states.66 Prior to 
Israel’s entry into the Gaza Strip in 1967, however, Gaza was not the 
 
 62. Id. (quoting S.C. Res. 1073, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1073 (1996)). 
 63. See U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Aff., Office of the Spokesman, 
Quartet Statement from the June 26, 2009 Meeting in Trieste, available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/06a/125433.htm (affirming the Quartet’s 
“determination to actively and vigorously seek a comprehensive resolution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict”). 
 64. See Quigley, supra note 60, at 738 (referencing a letter from the European 
Union to the PLO which also supports the conclusion that the parties have 
obligations under the agreements). 
 65. See infra Part IV. 
 66. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art. 2 (applying the 
Convention specifically to “High Contracting Parties”). 
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sovereign territory of any state party to the treaties. Turkey had 
renounced sovereignty in 1923; Britain never acquired sovereignty 
but instead ruled the territory under a League of Nations Mandate; 
and Egypt never claimed to have acquired sovereignty after its 
capture of the territory in 1948. Thus, Gaza has no permanent 
sovereign status and “belongs” to no one. Accordingly, and due to a 
general lack of clarity as to what exactly constitutes “effective 
control,” there has been some understandable ambivalence among 
the Israeli government, political community, and public as to 
whether Israel has occupied Gaza. 
Notwithstanding this ambivalence, the international community, 
spearheaded by the United Nations, has repeatedly declared the West 
Bank and Gaza to be occupied, and Israel has de facto conceded that 
point. From 1967 until 2005, Israel imposed a military administration 
on Gaza (and continues to do so in parts of the West Bank) and 
required itself, by means of military orders, to grant civilians the 
humanitarian protections outlined in the international law of 
occupied territories. In cases before the Israeli Supreme Court, the 
Israeli government has consistently agreed to concede, arguendo, the 
question of occupation, and has had the Court rule on the assumption 
that the West Bank (and, until 2005, Gaza) is governed by the 
international law of occupation. This concession is so deeply rooted 
in Israeli legal practice that in the 2002 Israeli Supreme Court case of 
Ajuri v. the Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, Justice 
Aharon Barak, President of Israel’s Supreme Court, blandly asserted 
in his decision that “Judaea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip are 
effectively one territory subject to one belligerent occupation by one 
occupying power.”67 
Israel understood that occupation could not continue indefinitely 
and that the situation as it was functioning posed an ongoing security 
challenge for the Israeli military and a constant danger to the Israeli 
civilian population. Israel thus withdrew from Gaza in September 
2005, with the intent that the Palestinian leadership would have 
complete authority in the territory and that Israel would no longer 
 
 67. HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank and 
Gaza [2002] 1, 2; see also HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel 
[2004] 1, 2 (noting that Israel had been belligerently occupying the West Bank 
since 1967). 
2010] IS GAZA OCCUPIED? 933 
have any obligations as an occupier.68 Some argue that the 
occupation of Gaza continues in spite of Israel’s disengagement from 
the territory because Israel has retained “effective control” over 
Gaza.69 However, since the disengagement from Gaza, Israel has 
maintained that it no longer has authority in Gaza, thus ending the 
occupation of the territory.70 
Israel’s detractors assert that “effective control” persists because 
Israel: 
• patrols Gaza’s territorial waters and maintains exclusive 
control in the air space over Gaza;71 
• controls the entire Israeli border with Gaza including the 
Erez, and Karni border crossings;72 
• is said to “control” Egypt’s border with Gaza, including 
the Rafah border crossing;73 
• supplies Gaza with electricity, fuel, telecommunications 
services, water, and sewage removal and is said to 
“control” the administration of these services in Gaza;74 
 
 68. See Israeli Office of the Prime Minister, The Cabinet Resolution Regarding 
the Disengagement Plan, June 6, 2004, available at 
http://www.awesomeseminars.com/docs/the_plan.pdf (“The completion of the plan 
will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians 
in the Gaza Strip.”). 
 69. See John Dugard, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/4/17 (Jan. 29, 2007) (maintaining that Gaza is effectively occupied 
because Israel controls the airspace over Gaza, the territorial waters next to it, the 
adjacent land crossing points of Rafah and Karni, and the external borders). 
 70. See HCJ 9132/07 Ahmad v. The Prime Minister of Israel [2008] 1, ¶ 12 
(“Israeli soldiers are not present in [Gaza] on a permanent basis and do not direct 
what occurs there”). 
 71. News Release, Hum. Rts. Watch, Israel/Egypt: Choking Gaza Harms 
Civilians (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/02/18/israelegypt-
choking-gaza-harms-civilians (last visited June 20, 2010) [hereinafter Israel/Egypt: 
Choking Gaza Harms Civilians]. 
 72. See id. (conceding that Israel does not have full control over the Rafah 
crossing between Gaza and Egypt); see also Dugard, supra note 69, ¶¶ 15-16 
(discussing Israel’s control of the six crossings in Gaza). 
 73. See Dugard, supra note 69, ¶¶ 15-16 (pointing out that since June 25, 2006, 
Israel has contributed to significant closures of the Rafah crossing). 
 74. Israel/Egypt: Choking Gaza Harms Civilians, supra note 71. 
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• maintains a population registry of Gazans and collects, on 
behalf of the Palestinian Authority, taxes on goods bound 
for Gaza passing through Israeli ports and is, therefore, 
said to “control” Gaza’s tax system and population 
registry;75 
• has identified security considerations and reserved for 
itself the right to re-enter Gaza for broadly self-defined 
“self-defense”;76 and 
• has the “ability” to exercise power over Gaza.77 
Arguably, it will be more likely that Israel will be viewed as 
having ended the occupation if it has fewer restrictions on Gaza than 
it does at present.78 However, the mere existence of restrictions on a 
territory does not necessarily indicate an occupation, and so it is 
important to be clear about what an exercise of “effective control” 
requires. Having influence over, responsibility for, restrictions on, or 
command of certain activities or resources is not an automatic 
indication of the level of “effective control” that is necessary to 
invoke the laws of occupation. This distinction is often obfuscated by 
the various international organizations and the media, who 
consistently misapply the term “effective control” in the context of 
an occupation and continue to disseminate information that supports 
incorrect and perhaps even misleading conclusions. 
This article proposes a three-part test for assessing the existence of 
“effective control” over a territory. The test, which is derived from 
the standards set forth in the Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, and the Hostages case, analyzes whether: 
 
 75. See B’TSELEM, The Gaza Strip: The Scope of Israeli Control in the Gaza 
Strip, http://www.btselem.org/english/Gaza_Strip/Gaza_Status.asp (last visited 
June 20, 2010) (explaining that authority for the administration of the population 
registry was formally transferred to the Palestinian Authority under the second 
Oslo Agreement, but that in practice Israel still exercises significant control over 
the registry). 
 76. See infra Part IV.E. 
 77. See infra Part IV.F. 
 78. See Reut Inst., End of Occupation, Nov. 8, 2004, http://reut-
institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=375 (last visited June 20, 2010) 
(asserting that even if the world does eventually view Israel as no longer being an 
occupier of Gaza, there are still other challenges Israel will face under international 
law in relation to its actions in Gaza). 
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1. the territory is “actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army[,]” and the “authority has been established and 
can be exercised”;79 
2. the state in power “exercises the functions of government 
in such territory”;80 and 
3. the authority of the occupier is “to the exclusion of the 
established government.”81 
Each of these requirements must be evaluated in light of the 
existing facts surrounding each circumstance and the relevant 
international agreements and laws pertaining thereto. If a 
circumstance fails any of the requirements of the “effective control” 
test, it follows that “effective control,” and consequently an 
occupation, does not exist. 
IV. DISMANTLING THE ARGUMENTS FOR 
EFFECTIVE CONTROL 
Whether Israel is exercising “effective control” over Gaza is a 
matter of legal interpretation combined with factual analysis. The 
following reasoning indicates how none of the assertions of Israeli 
authority in Part III of this article, even in combination, rise to the 
level of “effective control” under the legal test, thereby 
demonstrating that Israel’s relationship with Gaza is not subject to 
the laws of occupation. 
A. AUTHORITY OVER GAZA’S TERRITORIAL WATERS AND 
AIRSPACE  
Israel’s authority in the sea and air is not an exercise of “effective 
control” for two reasons. First, control over adjacent waters and air 
space does not constitute “effective control” over Gazan land. 
Second, Israel’s control is neither complete nor hostile. Israel also 
 
 79. Hague Regulations, supra note 27, art. 42. 
 80. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art. 6. 
 81. Hostages Case, supra note 40, at 55; see also Shany, Faraway, So Close, 
supra note 41, at 12-13 (explaining that the 2005 case of Democratic Republic of 
Congo v. Uganda rejected the using the potential for control as an indicator of 
effective control by applying a more restrictive reading of Article 42 of the Hague 
Regulations). 
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does not exercise total control over the sea because it has allowed 
Gazan authorities and civilians access to several nautical miles off 
Gaza’s coast. The control that Israel exercises is based on negotiated 
agreements between Israel and the PLO which grant Israel exclusive 
rights to the airspace over Gaza as well as significant control over 
adjacent waters. 
1. Territorial Waters  
By way of background, the range of territorial sea—the belt of 
water immediately adjacent to the coast of a nation—was at one 
point determined by range of vision, and was later amended to three 
nautical miles based on the range of cannon fire. The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) ultimately 
determined the range of the territorial sea to not exceed twelve 
nautical miles.82 
Article 1(1) of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone83 lays out the general rule of international law, 
stating: “The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory 
and its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described 
as the territorial sea.”84 In other words, only a state has sovereign 
authority over its territorial sea by definition.  
Despite Gaza’s lack of sovereignty, Article XVII(2)(a) of Oslo II 
granted the Palestinian Authority control over Gaza’s territorial 
waters.85 It can be argued that, in light of the sovereignty principle as 
it pertains to the law of the sea, access to territorial waters is inherent 
in statehood and the parties could not assign control over the 
territorial sea to Gaza. In recognizing that granting control was an 
allowance and not an automatic right for Gaza, the agreements also 
allowed the Israelis to override that control in the event of a threat to 
Israeli security. 
 
 82. See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, art. 3, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (reserving the Convention’s 
power to determine the “baselines” from which the range should be measured). 
 83. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 1(1), Apr. 
29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Oslo II, supra note 24, art. XVII(2)(a) (“Territorial jurisdiction 
includes land, subsoil and territorial waters . . . .”). 
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Article V(3)(a) of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement gave Israel the 
authority over “external security”86 of the territories, which extends 
to the territorial waters off Gaza’s shore. Oslo II elaborated upon that 
notion by giving Israel the exclusive responsibility to protect itself 
from the air and sea. Specifically, Chapter 2, Article XII(1) of Oslo 
II states: “Israel shall . . . carry the responsibility for defense against 
external threats . . .from the sea and from the air . . . and will have all 
the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.”87 
Although Gaza does not have an automatic right of access to its 
adjacent waters according to the Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Israel has granted the 
Palestinians in Gaza access to the waters for fishing and other 
ecological purposes. Before 2000, the Palestinians had access to the 
full twelve nautical miles of territorial waters in accordance with 
UNCLOS, but after the start of the Second Intifada in 2000, access 
was reduced to six nautical miles and then three in January 2009 
because of Israel’s continued external security concerns about the 
smuggling of weapons and ammunition into the Gaza Strip by sea.88 
Israel’s command of Gaza’s territorial waters is in line with 
international law and is not an exercise of “effective control” over 
Gaza. The fact that Israel has entered into agreements with the 
Palestinian Authority on the subject of territorial waters demonstrates 
that Israel’s actions were not “hostile” as required by Article 42 of 
the Hague Regulations and the first part of the “effective control” 
test. In light of these facts, Israel has gone beyond what is required 
with respect to international law by relinquishing the territorial sea to 
the Palestinians while still maintaining external security in 
accordance with their mutual agreements.  
2. Airspace 
Similar to the argument regarding the territorial waters, Gaza is 
not entitled as of right to the airspace above it because Gaza is not a 
 
 86. Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra note 48, art. V(3)(a). 
 87. Oslo II, supra note 24, art. XII(1). 
 88. See Israel-Opt: Gaza Fishing Industry Reeling, IRIN, Mar. 12, 2009, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=83422 (last visited June 20, 2010) 
(quoting an Israeli military source as saying that Israel had initially completely 
closed off access to the coast in order “to prevent the smuggling of weapons and 
ammunition into the Gaza Strip by sea,” but later widened access to three miles). 
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state. The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation 
(“Chicago Convention”) articulates the principle of sovereignty 
stating “[t]he contracting States recognize that every State has 
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its 
territory.”89 Notwithstanding the sovereignty principle, and because 
Gaza covers a very small geographic area, Article XII of the Gaza-
Jericho Agreement outlined the agreed terms by which the 
Palestinian Authority would, indeed, be able to operate air traffic out 
of the Gaza Airport while taking into account Israel’s security and air 
safety concerns.90 But, as seen in the previous section on territorial 
waters, Oslo II also gave Israel exclusive responsibility to defend 
itself from air in order to guard its external security.91 Moreover, 
Chapter 3, Article XVII(5) of Oslo II allows Israel the authority over 
the airspace in accordance with the other provisions of Oslo II, 
stating that “[t]he exercise of authority with regard to the 
electromagnetic sphere and air space shall be in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement.”92  
Looking at other factual scenarios, many countries have 
restrictions on their access to airspace based on mutual agreements 
which would not be a form of occupation. For instance, as a result of 
security arrangements created by the 1979 Treaty of Peace between 
Israel and Egypt,93 Egypt’s aerial sovereignty in Sinai is limited.94 In 
addition, to prevent air collisions, many small European states must 
coordinate their air traffic with their larger neighbors to prevent mid-
 
 89. Convention of International Civil Aviation art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, available at 
http://www.icao.int/icaonet /dcs/7300.html [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. The 
Convention excludes “state aircraft,” which include “military, customs and police 
services” aircraft, from its purview. Id. art. 3. It also restricts the ability of foreign 
state aircraft from flying through other states’ airspace “without authorization by 
special agreement.” Id. 
 90. See Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra note 48, art. XII. 
 91. Oslo II, supra note 24, art. XII(1). 
 92. See Oslo II, supra note 24, art. XVII(5). 
 93. See Isr.-Egypt Peace Treaty, Annex I, art. III, Mar. 26, 1979, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20
Process/Israel-Egypt%20Peace%20Treaty (dividing the relevant airspace into 
different zones); see also id. Annex I, app., art. VII (defining the limits of “[a]erial 
surveillance activities during the withdrawal”). 
 94. See Dore Gold, Legal Acrobatics: The Palestinian Claim that Gaza is Still 
“Occupied” Even After Israel Withdraws, 5 JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF 1 (2005) 
available at http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-3.htm (pointing out that no one 
would argue that such limitations on Egyptian sovereignty amount to occupation). 
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air collisions and therefore do not have the exclusive right to control 
their airspace. The cooperation between states in both of those 
scenarios does not pose a threat to state sovereignty or governmental 
authority.95 
There are also instances whereby a restriction on access to water 
or air by one power over another does not indicate that “effective 
control” has been exercised over the subject territory. Rather, the 
command was taken in an effort to force an opposing government to 
change its policies and was not necessarily an indication of intent to 
occupy the territory. 
A few examples clearly illustrate this point. First, during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, in order to prevent Cuba from 
importing nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles from the USSR, the 
United States imposed a “quarantine” around Cuba using naval and 
air units. The United States argued that this was not an act of war, 
while the communist countries protested that a blockade was in fact 
an act of war. No country argued that by imposing a quarantine 
America had somehow occupied Cuba. Though the United States did 
have enough control to ultimately encourage Cuba and the USSR to 
change their policies, it did not have nearly enough control to 
displace the Cuban government.96 
Second, during the 1990s, the United States and the United 
Kingdom maintained an unauthorized “no-fly-zone” over Iraq to 
ensure the Iraqi air force maintained limited access to various parts 
of the country, without approval from the U.N. Security Council.97 
They also imposed a sanctions regime that was enforced with naval 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 546, 
553-56 (1963) (examining the argument that the American quarantine of Cuba was 
a “‘peaceful method’ for settling a dispute,” rather than a threat to the integrity of 
that state, because it complied with international regulations). While Wright notes 
that the United States’ actions arguably constituted a “threat or use of force,” he 
does not characterize the Quarantine as having effectuated U.S. control of Cuba. 
Id. 
 97. See JEAN ALLAIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 160-61 
(Ashgate 2004) (1965) (using the existence of the no-fly-zone to illustrate that the 
conflict between the United States and Iraq did not fully end at the cessation of the 
Gulf War in 1991). 
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power.98 It has never been argued that the United Kingdom and the 
United States had occupied Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1990’s. 
Third, NATO’s victory over Serbia during the Clinton 
Administration was celebrated as the first war won almost entirely 
from the air. However, this measure of control was not “effective.” It 
was enough destruction to convince the Serbian government to 
reverse its policies toward the Albanians residing in its territory, but 
it was not enough control to supplant the Serbian government and 
directly impose Western policies on the Serbian people.99 
Command of the water adjacent to and air over a territory may 
confer some measure of control, but it falls far short of “effective 
control” within the meaning of the law of occupation. Similar to the 
aforementioned examples, Israel’s command of the air over Gaza and 
the waters next to it is not sufficiently comprehensive to indicate an 
exercise of the “functions of government” required by the second 
part of the “effective control” test. And, as seen in the section on 
territorial waters, the fact that Oslo II grants Israel the exclusive right 
to aerial defense undermines the “hostility” requirement of the first 
part of the test. It follows that restriction on access to territorial 
waters and airspace does not constitute “effective control” of Gaza. 
B. THE BORDER BETWEEN ISRAEL AND GAZA 
1. Borders and International Law 
The international law of borders is grounded in customary 
international law which dictates that a country has complete control 
over closing its borders to non-citizens. Nothing in international law 
requires a sovereign state to open its borders to the territories around 
it.100 However, customary international law does draw a distinction 
 
 98. See James Goldrick, Maritime sanctions Enforcement against Iraq, 1990-
2003, in NAVAL BLOCKADES AND SEAPOWER: STRATEGIES AND COUNTER-
STRATEGIES, 1805-2005, at 201, 201-02 (Bruce A. Elleman & S.C.M. Paine eds., 
2006) (remarking that the conflict constituted “one of the longest blockade 
operations in history”). 
 99. See Andrew L. Stigler, A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO’s Empty 
Threat to Invade Kosovo, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 2002/03, at 124, 125 
(suggesting that it was NATO’s air prowess that facilitated its victory). 
 100. See JUSTUS REID WEINER & AVI BELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
FIGHTING IN GAZA 16 ( 2008) (articulating the customary international law that 
allows a State to close its borders to non-citizens); see also Ekiu v. United States, 
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between the general rules of borders and the duties of a state toward 
an individual at the border.101 The international law governing border 
closure on the interstate level is generally accepted by the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), but the law regulating border 
closure affecting individuals is still highly contentious and is 
regulated by several treaties and practices establishing the rights of 
individuals under international law.102  
Customary international law relating to borders evolved after 
World War II. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”) was drafted in response to the atrocities committed 
during World War II in order to acknowledge the existence of basic 
human rights, including the right to move freely. Although not a 
treaty, the UDHR has been incorporated into international law as part 
of international custom. Article 13(1) of the UDHR provides that 
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement and residence 
within the borders of each state.” 103 The UDHR also declares that 
“[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, 
and to return to his country.”104 Freedom of movement is posited as 
existing within the borders of a state and encompasses the right to 
leave and return to one’s own country, but that right is not mirrored 
in a corresponding right of entry into another country. One state 
cannot send individuals across its border without permission from 
the neighboring state to receive them.105 The fact that an independent 
state still has the authority to close its borders at any time, with or 
without cause, is reflected in human rights law by the failure of the 
 
142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“[E]very sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in 
sovereignty, and essential to its self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of 
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such 
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”). 
 101. See THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACROSS BORDERS 2 (Louis Sohn & 
Thomas Buergenthal eds., Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 1992) (noting that individuals have 
rights that may supersede the general rules regulating sovereign borders). 
 102. See id. at 4 (citing various international agreements which deal with the 
issue of individuals crossing, or attempting to cross, the border from one country to 
another). 
 103. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 
13(1), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) 
[hereinafter UDHR]. 
 104.  Id. art. 13(2). 
 105. See WEINER & BELL, supra note 100, at 16 (noting that a sovereign nation 
has the right to close its borders to non-citizens). 
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so-called right to “freedom of movement” to emerge as an 
enforceable right between states. However, the UDHR offers 
exceptions to the rule for asylum seekers106 and the U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees offers exceptions regarding 
refugees.107 
2. The Crossings 
There are three primary crossing points from Gaza into Israel: 
Karni, Erez, and Rafah. In addition to those crossings, there are three 
secondary crossings: Sufa in the south, which is now closed but was 
open to Palestinians who were working on Israeli farms and was also 
used for cargo; Nahal Oz, which is used as a fuel terminal; and 
Kerem Shalom in the south-east, which is used for the transfer of 
cargo.108 Following Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005, Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority reached an agreement on border 
crossings to and from Gaza. The agreement details are contained in 
two documents. The first document is the Agreement on Movement 
and Access (“AMA”), which allows the Palestinians and Egypt to 
control the Rafah crossing and allows for increased traffic through 
the Erez and Karni crossings, which are managed by Israel.109 The 
second document is the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing 
 
 106. See UDHR, supra note 103, art. 14(1) (“Everyone has the right to seek and 
to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”). 
 107. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33(1), Apr. 22, 
1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”). 
 108. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Aff., Humanitarian Assistance to Gaza 
During the Period of Calm (June 19-Dec. 18, 2008), Dec. 26, 2008, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2008/Humanitarian_assis
tance+_to_Gaza_since_June_19_calm_understanding_18_Nov_2008.htm 
[hereinafter Humanitarian Assistance to Gaza] (detailing specific instances of 
transfers of humanitarian assistance through the various passages). 
 109. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Aff., Agreed Documents on Movement and 
Access from and to Gaza, Nov. 15, 2005, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Agreed+docu
ments+on+movement+and+access+from+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov-2005.htm 
[hereinafter Agreed Documents on Movement] (stating the parties’ intention that 
the agreement will “promote peaceful economic development and improve the 
humanitarian situation on the ground”). 
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(“APRC”), which elaborates on the general provisions of the 
AMA.110 
The Karni crossing is located in the northeastern end of the Gaza 
Strip and is used as a cargo terminal for imports and exports. Karni is 
managed by the Israel Airports Authority. The crossing was opened 
in 1996, but after the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007, Israel 
has mostly closed the crossing due to concerns about security 
breaches. Having previously been used for the passage of most forms 
of cargo, the crossing is now only used as a station for transporting 
wheat and animal feed through a conveyor belt.111 
The Erez crossing—the only pedestrian crossing from Gaza into 
Israel—is located at the northern end of the Gaza Strip and is 
managed by the IDF. During the comparatively calm years of the 
1990s before the eruption of the Second Intifada, tens of thousands 
of Palestinians entered Israel every day through the Erez crossing, 
but after the Second Intifada began in 2000, Israel tightened security 
at the borders and presently only allows 5,000 Palestinians into Israel 
daily.112 
Recognizing that security risks arise from both successful and 
attempted attacks on the crossing points, and despite accusations of 
“collective punishment” of the Palestinian people because of the 
closures,113 Israel has gone to great lengths to ensure that the 
population of Gaza receives necessary supplies and has access to 
necessary medical treatment. For instance, due to concerns about an 
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, 125,000 vaccines had been 
supplied to Gaza through the Karni crossing in the three months in 
the first half of 2009. However, on June 8, 2009, a plan to attack the 
Karni crossing using horses laden with explosives was foiled, and the 
IDF subsequently closed the crossing. Because the Karni crossing 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Humanitarian Assistance to Gaza, supra note 108. 
 112. See Greg Myre, Gaza Crossings: Choked Passages to Frustration, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at A1 (observing that the ability to cross the border into Israel 
is important to Palestinian’s seeking to earn better salaries by working jobs in 
Israel). 
 113. See Isabel Kershner, Israeli Airstrike in Gaza Kills 2 Hamas Members, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008, at A14 (reporting that John Dugard, the Special 
Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council on the situation of human rights in 
occupied Palestinian territory, viewed Israel’s actions as such collective 
punishment). 
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closure disrupted the shipment of 30,000 more vaccines for foot-and-
mouth disease into Gaza, the IDF redirected the shipment to the Erez 
crossing.114 
The Rafah crossing in the south is the sole major crossing point 
into Egypt from Gaza and is currently controlled by Egypt and the 
Hamas-led government of the Palestinian Authority. Israel has not 
exercised any direct control over the Rafah crossing since September 
2005.115 
The AMA specifies that the Rafah crossing shall be operated by 
“the Palestinian Authority on its side, and Egypt on its side.”116 
Commenting on the AMA and Palestinian control over Rafah, 
Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erakat confirmed that “[t]his is the 
first time in history we[, the Palestinians,] will run an international 
passage by ourselves, and it’s the first time Israel does not have a 
veto over our ability to do so.”117 
The APRC stipulated that there also be a role for a third party to 
monitor the Rafah crossing.118 On November 25, 2005, the Council 
of the European Union agreed that the EU should undertake the third 
party role proposed in the APRC and therefore established the EU 
Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (“EUBAM”) to monitor the 
operations of the Rafah crossing.119 Because of security 
considerations, EUBAM was based out of Ashkelon, Israel, rather 
than Gaza, and became operational on November 30, 2005.120 
 
 114. See Yaakov Lappin, After Foiled Gaza Attack, IDF Says Hamas Risking 
Another Gaza Offensive, JERUSALEM POST, June 9, 2009, available at 
http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=144771 (detailing the attempted 
armed assault at Karni and the consequences resulting from the security breach). 
 115.  See B’TSELEM, supra note 75 (characterizing Israel’s role with regard to 
the Rafah crossing as merely “supervisory”). 
 116. Agreed Documents on Movement, supra note 109. 
 117. Robin Wright & Scott Wilson, Rice Negotiates Deal to Open Gaza 
Crossings; Secretary Pushes Late into Night to Win Israeli-Palestinian Accord, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2005, at A12. 
 118. See Agreed Documents on Movement, supra note 109 (specifying that one 
of the prerequisites to Rafah opening was the presence of the third party on site). 
 119. See Press Release, Council of the European Union, EU Border Assistance 
Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (Nov. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5366_en.htm (articulating that one 
aim of EUBAM is to foster confidence between the Palestinian Authority and 
Israeli Government). 
 120. EUBAM, FAQs: Why Is EUBAM Based in Israel?, http://www.eubam-
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After the disengagement from Gaza and the development of the 
AMA and APRC, relative optimism took hold in Israel, but was later 
stanched by three major regional events. First, Hamas, a globally 
recognized terrorist organization,121 won Palestinian parliamentary 
elections in January 2006, which indicated that the prospect for a real 
partnership towards peace would be much more difficult to 
achieve.122 Second, Hamas attacked Israel on June 25, 2006 and 
kidnapped Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit. Due to the security breach 
following the attack, Israel closed its borders to Gaza. Finally, there 
was a Hamas-orchestrated explosion at the Rafah crossing on July 
14, 2006. Israel was not in control of the Rafah crossing and was 
therefore powerless to stop the breach.123 
Egypt has largely kept the Rafah crossing closed since Hamas took 
control of Gaza in June 2007 because of “concerns of a spillover of 
Hamas-style militancy into Egypt.”124 At that time, EUBAM also 
temporarily ceased operations125 because of “security concerns and 
the fact that the EU, like Israel and the US, has a policy not to permit 
direct contact with Hamas officials until it renounces terror, 
recognizes Israel’s sovereignty as an existing state, and honors past 
Palestinian agreements reached with Israel.”126 The Rafah crossing 
 
rafah.eu/node/2311 (last visited June 21, 2010). 
 121. See Adam Entous, Hamas takeover in Gaza would short-circuit U.S. plans, 
REUTERS, June 13, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL136399920070613 
(last visited June 20, 2010) (pointing out that the United States, European Union, 
and Israel all consider Hamas to be a terrorist organization). 
 122. See Hamas Wins Majority in Palestinian Government, ONLINE NEWSHOUR, 
Jan. 26, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/hamas_01-26-06.html (last 
visited TBD) (classifying Hamas’ parliamentary victory as a landslide). 
 123. See Palestinians breach Gaza border, BBC NEWS, July 14, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5181520.stm (last visited June 20, 2010) 
(explaining that eventually Palestinian forces gained control of the area). 
 124. Gazans Pour Into Egypt After Militants Blast Hole in Border, TIMES 
ONLINE, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/ 
article3236517.ece (last visited June 20, 2010) [hereinafter Gazans Pour into 
Egypt]. 
 125. See Press Release, EUBAM, Temporary Suspension of Operations (June 6, 
2007), available at http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/node/399 (noting that, despite the 
temporary suspension of operations, EUBAM still recognizes the value of having 
an open border and functioning Rafah crossing). 
 126. Calev Ben-David, Analyze This: Waiting for the Call to Return to Rafah, 
JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 21, 2008, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ued 
ocs/cmsUpload/080421_JerusalemPost_Analyze_this-waiting_for_the_call_to_ret 
urn_to_Rafah.pdf. 
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was last opened with the presence of the EUBAM on June 9, 2007. 
Since then, the mission has remained on standby, ready to re-engage 
while awaiting a political solution.127 
While border control is, in fact, a function of government, Israel is 
exercising its own rights with respect to its own borders and not 
displacing Gaza’s government, thus undermining both the second 
and third parts of the “effective control” test. In monitoring and 
periodically closing its borders, Israel is acting within its rights under 
international law, and the exceptions for refugees and asylum-
seekers do not generally apply to the Palestinians in Gaza. In 
addition, the terms of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and Oslo II grant 
Israel absolute authority over “external security” matters which 
would apply to Gaza’s borders as well the airspace and territorial 
waters.128 This, once again, undercuts the “hostility” requirement of 
the first part of the “effective control” test. 
Furthermore, the assertion that Israel controls Rafah is false, as 
evidenced by the AMA and the APRC. On the basis of the above-
mentioned facts, accusations that Israel is collectively punishing the 
entire population of Gaza for the acts of a few by closing its borders 
to the Palestinians appears to be politically motivated; that 
Palestinians have access to another point of exit is never mentioned 
along with these accusations. Egypt to the south monitors the border 
crossing at Rafah and has chosen to close its doors as well because of 
its own security concerns. Israel’s authority over Rafah is therefore 
neither “established” nor “exercised” as required by the Hague 
Regulations. For all of these reasons, Israel’s actions on the border 
with Gaza, while arguably influential, do not give rise to the 
“effective control” required to qualify for an occupation under 
international law. 
 
 127. See Press Release, Council of the European Union, supra note 119 
(explaining that EUBAM has a stand-by force that will be able to fully redeploy if 
the Rafah crossing is reopened). 
 128. See supra Part IV.A (articulating why Israel’s authority over the sea and air 
surrounding Gaza does not amount to an exercise of “effective control”). 
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C. GAZA’S INFRASTRUCTURE  
1. Electricity, Fuel, and Telecommunications 
A large share of electricity in Gaza is produced internally, and 
supplied by a single power plant operated by the Palestine Electric 
Company (“PEC”). The PEC is a very profitable enterprise, having 
earned $4.4 million in 2007 and $6.3 million in 2008.129 Fuel for the 
plant is imported through Israel.130 Different sources claim different 
percentages of electricity produced within Gaza, with estimates 
ranging from 25% to 50%. Pursuant to a part of the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement preserved by the Oslo II agreement131 the remainder is 
supplied by the Israeli Electric Company (“IEC”).132 In addition, the 
Agreement stipulates that the supply of fuel or gas will take into 
account Israeli standards of safety and security.133 With regard to 
 
 129. See Adam Entous, War Ravaged Gaza Power Company Pays 
Shareholders, REUTERS, Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLE31 
9399 (last visited June 20, 2010) (“Profits are largely distributed in tax-free 
dividends.”). 
 130. See Heather Sharp, Guide: Gaza Under Blockade, BBC NEWS, June 15, 
2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7545636.stm (last visited 
June 20, 2010). 
 131. See Oslo II, supra note 24, Annex III, art. 10 (affirming that the Israeli 
Electric Company (“IEC”) will have unfettered “access to the electricity grid” in 
Gaza). 
 132. See Martin Patience, Gaza’s Infrastructure Suffers, BBC NEWS, June 29, 
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east/5130510.stm (last visited June 20, 
2010) (noting that the sole power plant in Gaza produces approximately half of 
Gaza’s electricity); see also Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra note 48, Annex II, art. 
II(B)(24)(b). 
Pending the establishment by the Palestinian Authority of an alternative 
system for the Gaza Strip it shall temporarily buy electric power from the 
Israel Electric Company (IEC), and to that end shall enter into a commercial 
agreement with the IEC. This Agreement shall relate to the settling of debts; 
to IEC property; and to the maintenance of lines to Palestinian customers. 
Id.; cf. EU Confirms Halt to Gaza Fuel Aid, BBC NEWS, Aug. 20, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6954120.stm (last visited June 20, 2010) 
(reporting that the plant produces “at least 25%” of electricity); Tani Goldstein, 
We’re Supplying Electricity to Gaza Under Qassam Fire, YNET NEWS, Jan. 21, 
2008, http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3496729,00.html (last visited 
June 20, 2010, 2010) (explaining that the Israel Electric Corporation supplies 70% 
and the Gaza plant supplies 30%). 
 133. See id. Annex II, art. II(B)(36)(e) (“Transfer of gas or fuel products through 
or to Israel and the West Bank shall be in accordance with Israeli standards 
concerning safety, security and environmental protection, and in accordance with 
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telecommunications services, the Oslo II agreement also provides for 
its supply based on a contract between the Palestinian Authority and 
a private Israeli company: 
Pending the establishment of an independent Palestinian 
telephone network, the Palestinian side shall enter into a 
commercial agreement with Bezeq - The Israel 
Telecommunications Corp. Ltd. (herein, “Bezeq”), regarding 
supply of certain services in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. 134 
It must be noted that telecommunications supply by Israel may be 
terminated once the Palestinian Authority establishes it own system. 
In the past Israel has cut off or restricted electricity to Gaza which 
also affected telecommunications and the fuel supply needed for 
backup generators when power is lost. This occurred most recently 
during the conflict with Gaza in the winter of 2008-2009, with the 
electrical supply later being restored to pre-conflict levels. In 
addressing its security concerns, Israel has also limited fuel supply in 
retaliation for unlawful rocket attacks by armed groups which caused 
a lot of destruction in Israeli territory, most notably in 2007 after 
Hamas took power.135 In light of Israel’s ability to place these 
limitations on Gaza, Israel’s detractors argue that the restrictions are 
an indication of “effective control.”136 However, Israel is not the only 
country that has placed restrictions on energy for political reasons, 
and doing so has not been deemed to be an exercise of “effective 
control,” as evidenced by the examples that follow. 
Russia reduced the supply of gas to Ukraine in the winter of 2009 
because of an escalation in a gas price dispute. As a result, gas 
 
the arrangements regarding entry into Israel.”). 
 134. Oslo II, supra note 24, Annex III, art. 36(D)(1). 
 135. See Sharp, supra note 130 (enumerating the limitations imposed by Israel 
after Hamas seized control in 2007, including eliminating nearly all fuel imports 
and drastically reducing the amount of fuel to operate the Palestinian power plant 
that provides electricity for parts of Gaza). 
 136. See News Release, Hum. Rts. Watch, Israel: Disengagement Will Not End 
Gaza Occupation (Oct. 28, 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/ 
10/28/israel-disengagement-will-not-end-gaza-occupation (last visited June 20, 
2010) [hereinafter Israel: Disengagement Will Not End Gaza Occupation] 
(explaining that the absence of Israeli troops inside Gaza does not mean that Israel 
is not exercising control over the territory). 
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supplies that are channeled to Europe via Ukraine were completely 
shut down, which prompted the European Union to call for an 
immediate solution. Europe imports forty percent of its fuel from 
Russia; therefore Russia’s conflict with the Ukraine caused a serious 
energy crisis because the reduction affected the supply of natural gas 
to the Czech Republic, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and 
Bulgaria.137 Russia’s reluctance to immediately resolve the dispute 
was argued to be a politically motivated move to send a message “to 
Europe that Ukraine should not be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic 
zone, but remain within the Russian sphere of influence.”138 
Past actions of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (“OPEC”) provide another example. In 1973, the Arab 
members restricted the world’s oil supply to protest Western support 
for Israel during the Yom Kippur War.139 During that time, after 
failed negotiations with the world’s major oil companies, OPEC’s 
Arab members used their control over the world price-setting 
mechanism to quadruple the world’s oil prices.140 
In neither of those cases did the United Nations or the 
international community assert that Russia and OPEC were 
exercising “effective control” over the territories to which they 
limited supplies. Israel, while perhaps causing a certain amount of 
difficulty for the population of Gaza, was likewise not engaging in an 
exercise of “effective control” solely by limiting Gaza’s energy 
supply. 
The supply of electricity to Gaza is pursuant to a private 
contractual relationship that was created by the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement and preserved by Oslo II which, once again, removes the 
 
 137. See generally David Jolly & Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine says Russia Halts 
all Gas to Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/europe/07iht-
08gazprom.19150762.html (discussing the effects of Russia’s reduction in the 
supply of gas to Ukraine). 
 138. Ariel Cohen & Owen Graham, European Security and Russia's Natural 
Gas Supply Disruption, Heritage Found., JAN. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/russiaandeurasia/wm2194.cfm. 
 139. Deborah Halber, Seventies Oil Crisis was a “Perfect Storm” for U.S., 
MITNEWS, Mar. 23, 2007, http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2007/jacobs.html (last 
visited June 20, 2010). 
 140. See id. (noting that Americans were not ready to deal with the energy 
shortage that ensued). 
950 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:915 
element of hostility from the interaction between Israel and the 
Palestinians as required by the first part of the “effective control” 
test. The terms of the supply contract were not imposed by one party 
over the other; they were achieved through a series of contractual 
negotiations. Furthermore, supplying electricity to Gaza is not an 
attempt on Israel’s part to exercise a “function of government” in 
Gaza. On the contrary, the Palestinian Authority is exercising its own 
governmental authority by negotiating and contracting for the supply 
of resources on behalf of its population. This indicates a failure of 
the third part of the “effective control” test: the Palestinian Authority 
has not been “excluded” from power over its territory, but rather it 
has been empowered to act on behalf of the people of Gaza. 
2. Water Supply and Sewage Removal 
In 2004, prior to Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, Human Rights 
Watch released a statement asserting that regardless of Israel’s 
withdrawal, Israel would still maintain control over many key 
aspects of Gaza including Gaza’s water supply and sewage 
networks.141 This statement is patently incorrect, and as of the 
introduction of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in 1994 and Oslo II 
which preserved that Agreement’s terms, and until the present day, 
the supply of part of Gaza’s water is based on a contractual 
relationship with an Israeli company. Sewage removal has always 
been and remains the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority.142 
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement states that “[t]he Palestinian Authority 
shall pay Mekoroth for the cost of water supplied from Israel and for 
the real expenses incurred in supplying water to the Palestinian 
Authority,”143 and that “[a]ll relations between the Palestinian 
Authority and Mekoroth shall be dealt with in a commercial 
agreement.”144 
The Palestinian Authority buys some of its water from 
Mekoroth—Israel’s water authority—and Gaza also has its own 
internal wells. Sewage removal in Gaza is handled internally and is 
 
 141. Israel: Disengagement Will Not End Gaza Occupation, supra note 136. 
 142. Oslo II, supra note 24, Annex III, art. 40(25); Gaza-Jericho Agreement, 
supra note 48, Annex II, art. II(B)(31). 
 143. Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra note 48, Annex II, art. II(B)(31)(e). 
 144. Id. Annex II, art. II(B)(31)(f). 
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not managed by any Israeli entity.145 The Gaza-Jericho Agreement 
provides that “[a]ll water and sewage (hereinafter referred to as 
‘water’) systems and resources in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho 
Area shall be operated, managed and developed (including drilling) 
by the Palestinian Authority, in a manner that shall prevent any harm 
to the water resources.”146 It also states “[t]he Palestinian Authority 
shall take the appropriate measures to prevent the uncontrolled 
discharge in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area of sewage and 
effluence to water sources including underground and surface water 
and rivers, and to promote the proper treatment of sanitary and 
industrial waste water.”147 
However, under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, one exception to 
total Palestinian control placed the management of water and sewage 
in the Israeli settlements and military installations in Gaza under the 
authority of Israel through Mekoroth.148 Israel’s removal of the 
settlements and installations in 2005, therefore, completely cancelled 
any relationship Israel had with Gaza with respect to water supply 
and sewage removal. Gaza’s internal wells and sewage treatment 
facilities are dependent on electricity and/or imported fuel, thus 
linking the water supply to the energy supply.149 Although water 
supply and sewage treatment can be affected by limitations on 
energy supply, that does not indicate control over those functions.150 
In light of this, the “effective control” test fails in its entirety because 
the Palestinian Authority—not the Israeli government—has complete 
control over this matter and not the Israeli government. 
 
 145. Id. Annex II, art. II(B)(31)(a). 
 146. Id. Annex II, art. II(B)(31)(a). 
 147. Id. Annex II, art. II(B)(35)(c). 
 148. See id. Annex II, art. II(B)(31)(b) (“As an exception to subparagraph a., the 
existing water systems supplying water to the Settlements and the Military 
Installation Area, and the water systems and resources inside them continue to be 
operated and managed by Mekoroth Water Co.”). 
 149. See Maher Najjar, Fire and Water in Gaza, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2009, at 
A17 (“Power is needed to run treatment plants, pump water to homes and pump 
sewage away from populated areas.”); see also Mekorot Restructuring Plan Gets 
the Go-Ahead, GLOBAL WATER INTELL., Apr. 2002, available at 
http://www.globalwaterintel.com/archive/3/4/general/mekorot-restructuring-plan-
gets-the-go-ahead.html (noting that a Mekorot subsidiary supplies water to Gaza). 
 150. See supra Part IV.C.1 (arguing that whatever involvement Israel has with 
respect to Gaza’s power supply does not rise to the level of effective control). 
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Now that Israel has fully withdrawn from Gaza, there are no 
grounds upon which to claim that Israel exercises any form of 
“effective control” over electricity, fuel, telecommunications, water 
supply, or sewage removal in Gaza, neither based on the agreements 
entered into by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, nor the private 
contracts signed between Israeli and Palestinian entities, nor based 
on the facts on the ground. 
D. TAXATION AND POPULATION REGISTRY IN GAZA 
1. Taxation 
Article VI(2) of the Oslo Accords provides that “authority will be 
transferred to the Palestinians on the . . . sphere[] . . . [of] direct 
taxation.”151 In addition, Articles V and VI of the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement expanded upon the Oslo Accords and outlined the 
responsibilities of the Israelis and Palestinians with respect to direct 
and indirect taxation. For the most part, Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority each determine, regulate, levy and collect their own 
taxes,152 “including income tax on individuals and corporations, 
property taxes, municipal taxes and fees.”153  
The Israeli government only collects taxes from those Palestinians 
who work inside Israel,154 just as many states collect taxes from 
foreign workers who are employed within their territories. For 
instance, in the United States, foreign workers are required to pay 
U.S. taxes. There are exemptions that foreign agricultural workers 
and non-resident aliens have for Social Security and Medicare, but 
income taxes still apply, though the foreign workers may be taxed at 
graduated rates.155 
Of the taxes that Israel collects from Palestinians employed in the 
state, Israel transfers nearly all the income taxes that are collected 
 
 151. Oslo Accords, supra note 23, art. VI(2). 
 152. Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra note 48, Annex IV, arts. V-VI. 
 153. Id. Annex IV, art. V(1). 
 154. See id. Annex IV, art. V(4) (outlining where the income tax revenue from 
Palestinians working in Israel will go). 
 155. See U.S. Internal Revenue Service [IRS], Foreign Agricultural Workers: 
Withholding Tax Requirements, Nov. 19, 2009, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/businesses/small/international,article/0,,id=96422,0
0.html (laying out the tax filing requirements for H-2A agricultural workers). 
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from Gaza residents back to the Palestinian Authority. Annex V, 
Article V(4) of Oslo II states: 
Israel will transfer to the Palestinian side a sum equal to: 
a. 75% of the income taxes collected from Palestinians from 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip employed in Israel. 
b. The full amount of income taxes collected from 
Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
employed in the Settlements.156 
Both the Israeli and the Palestinian tax administrations levy and 
collect value added taxes (“VAT”) and purchase taxes on local 
production. But Oslo II indicates the Israeli VAT rate to be 17% and 
the Palestinian VAT rate was 15% to 16%.157 The provisions on both 
income tax and VAT are clearly favorable to the Palestinian 
Authority. 
Israel also collects import tariffs on Gaza-bound goods that 
originate from beyond either Israel or the Palestinian territories. It is 
important to note that Israel only collects taxes in situations 
emanating from economic activity within Israel, such as goods being 
transshipped through Israel and Palestinian employment in Israel. 
Israel does not collect any taxes relating to business activity or 
incomes in Gaza proper.158  
Although it is indeed true that levying and collecting taxes is a 
function of government, the only taxes that Israel collects on behalf 
of the Palestinian Authority are the income taxes on Palestinian 
employees within Israel, a common and well-accepted international 
practice. As apparent from Oslo II, Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority have responsibility for taxation in their respective areas, 
which undermines the “hostility” requirement of the first part of the 
“effective control” test. Moreover, Israel’s actions in that regard do 
not supplant the powers of the Palestinian Authority to collect their 
own taxes as required by the third part of the test. Therefore, the 
 
 156. Oslo II, supra note 24, Annex V, art. V(4). 
 157. Id. Annex V, art. VI(3). 
 158. See id. Annex V, art. V(1) (explaining that Israel and the Palestinian 
territories will have control over directly taxing individuals and corporations in 
their respective territories). 
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argument that Israel’s collection of some taxes does not demonstrate 
the level of “effective control” required for an occupation under 
international law. 
2. Population Registry 
Article VI(1)(d) of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, entitled “Powers 
and Responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority,” grants the 
Palestinian Authority the “power to keep and administer registers 
and records of the population, and issue certificates, licenses and 
documents.”159 Oslo II preserved the terms of the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement in Article 28 of Annex III, Appendix 1: 
Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of population 
registry and documentation in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip will be transferred from the military government and its 
Civil Administration to the Palestinian side.  
The Palestinian side shall maintain and administer a 
population registry and issue certificates and documents of all 
types, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this 
Agreement. To this end, the Palestinian side shall receive 
from Israel the population registry for the residents of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip in addition to files and records 
concerning them . . . .160 
The assertion that Israel controls the population registry of the 
Palestinian Authority is thus incorrect. Article X(3)(f) of the 
Agreement entitled “Control and Management of the Passages,” 
underscores the fallacy of this assertion; it states:161 
In the Palestinian Wing, each side will have the authority to 
deny the entry of persons who are not residents of the Gaza 
Strip and West Bank. For the purpose of this Agreement, 
“residents of the Gaza Strip and West Bank” means persons 
who, on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, are 
registered as residents of these areas in the population 
registry maintained by the military government of the Gaza 
Strip and West Bank, as well as persons who have 
 
 159. Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra note 48, art. VI(1)(d). 
 160. Oslo II, supra note 24, Annex III, App. 1, art. 28(1)-(2). 
 161. Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra note 48, Annex I, art. X(3)(f). 
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subsequently obtained permanent residency in these areas 
with the approval of Israel, as set out in this Agreement.162 
Furthermore, Article II(27)(a) of Annex II of the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement relating to the “Population Registry and Documentation” 
requires that the Palestinian Authority “receive the existing 
population registry in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, as well as 
files pertaining to the residents of these areas.”163 
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement does allow Israel some involvement 
with monitoring the population registry and identification cards of 
the Palestinian Authority, but it does not control either of those 
functions. For example, when the Palestinians update their registry, 
Israel is supposed to be notified, “[i]n order to ensure efficient 
passage procedures” between Gaza and the Jericho Area.164 Israel 
also has legitimate security concerns that would require the 
establishment of a uniform system of identification so that it may 
have knowledge of who will be entering Israeli territory. The Gaza-
Jericho Agreement lays out this stipulation by requiring that 
“[p]ossession of [an] identity card and, whenever necessary, of an 
Israeli entrance permit, shall be required for entry into Israel by 
residents of the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area.”165 Israel’s actions 
are reasonable security measures because Palestinians must cross 
through Israel to go from Gaza to the West Bank. 
Control over the identification system and population registry was 
granted to the Palestinian Authority in order for it to exercise its 
governmental functions with respect to its own population. That 
control is not displaced by the Israeli government, thus failing the 
third part of the “effective control” test. And, as the hostility element 
of the first part of the test is not satisfied due to the existence of the 
agreements between the two parties, Israel’s involvement is minimal 
at most and falls far short of that which is necessary to satisfy the 
required standards for “effective control.” 
 
 162. Id. (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. Annex II, art. II(27)(a). 
 164. Id. Annex II, art. II(27)(e). 
 165. Id. Annex II, art. II(27)(c). 
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E. ISRAEL’S SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND RIGHT TO RE-
ENTER GAZA  
Israel’s right to safeguard its national security is derived from the 
inherent right to self-defense, which in turn is enshrined in Article 51 
of the U.N. Charter.166 The right of states to self-defense also extends 
to claims against non-state actors because Article 51 does not make a 
distinction between armed attacks by state actors and non-state 
actors.167 Furthermore, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution recognizing the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance 
with the U.N. Charter and encouraged states to combat “threats to 
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.”168 
The proposition that Israel’s general right to self-defense is an 
indication of “effective control” is contrary to the position of the 
U.N. Charter and the U.N. Security Council. That right was 
recognized by and reflected in the agreements between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority in the several clauses granting Israel authority 
in the areas of external security.169 The assertion that Israel has given 
itself overriding security considerations demonstrates a lack of 
appreciation for the dire threat that Israel faces from attacks that 
emanate from Gaza, and runs counter to the mutual understanding 
regarding Israel’s security concerns that form the backbone of each 
of the agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. 
Some argue that reserving the right to re-enter is also an indication 
that Israel still retains “effective control” over Gaza. However, 
 
 166. U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations . . . .”); see also 1949 Y.B. INT'L L. 
COMM'N 178, art. 12 (“Every State has the right of individual or collective self-
defence against armed attack.”); R.P. DHOKALIA, THE CODIFICATION OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 272 (1970) (explaining that the right to self-defense was one 
of four rights of states included in the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States). 
 167. See generally William V. O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence, and Self-Defense 
in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 421 (1990) (discussing how the 
theory of self-defense applies when defending against terrorist attacks, and how 
that theory has evolved since 1953). 
 168. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
 169. See, e.g., Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra note 48, art. V(3)(a) (“Israel has 
authority over . . . external security . . . .”). 
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reserving the right to re-enter a territory because of security 
considerations is a common reservation made by a withdrawing 
occupying power. Indeed, when the Allied forces left West Germany 
after signing the General Treaty ending the occupation of the 
territory in 1955, they included a clause in the treaty that also 
reserved certain emergency rights in case of public disorder in 
Germany. These rights were only suspended in 1968 after the 
Bundestag approved the German Emergency Laws.170  
It must also be remembered that the goal of an occupation is to 
ultimately return the occupied territory to a peaceful situation after 
the end of a military conflict, and if threats continue to emanate from 
within that territory, re-entry can be deemed to be for the purpose of 
maintaining security or preventing chaos and not for the reassertion 
of occupation as seen in the above case. Israel indicated that the 
intention behind disengagement was for there to be “no basis for 
claiming that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory.”171 The notion that 
the reservation of the right of re-entry was for Israel to maintain its 
occupational hold on Gaza contradicts the disengagement plan’s 
stated premise. 
While requiring a belief that the need to stop chaos from ensuing 
would necessitate “effective control,”172 emergency rights or 
reserving the right to re-enter, are not, in and of themselves, 
tantamount to a continued exercise of “effective control” and 
occupation. The contentions regarding security and re-entry fail the 
third part of the “effective control” test, which requires that the 
occupier actually exclude the government in power from exercising 
its authority. This concept will be developed further in the next part. 
 
 170. Bernard Blumenau, Sixty Years of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
PAPIERS D’ACTUALITÉ/CURRENT AFF. PERSP., May 2009, available at 
http://www.fondation-pierredubois.ch/Papiers-d-actualite/sixty-years-of-the-
federal-republic-of-germany.html; see also EURO. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY 
THROUGH LAW [VENICE COMM’N], HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FUNCTIONING OF 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 39 (Council of Eur. 1997) 
(explaining that these laws consisted of “seventeen emergency amendments to the 
Basic Law”). 
 171. The Disengagement Plan, supra note 2. 
 172. See VENICE COMM’N, supra note 170, at 37 (”In today’s Europe, making 
provision for states of emergency is considered a necessity for democracy itself.”) 
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F. ISRAEL’S “ABILITY” TO EXERCISE POWER OVER GAZA 
The ability or potential to exercise “effective control” over a 
territory as the sole basis to claim the existence of an occupation has 
been discredited by the international courts. 
Those who assert the position that the simple ability to control 
amounts to occupation often cite the case of The Prosecutor v. 
Mladen Naletilic and Vinko Martinovic before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”).173 Paragraph 
217 of the decision held that the establishment of authority can be 
determined by an occupying power having “a sufficient force 
present, or the capacity to send troops within a reasonable time to 
make the authority of the occupying power felt.”174 However, in 
referring to this clause, it is often removed from the immediate 
surrounding context in the ICTY’s official publication of the case. In 
addition to the above citation, the court also gave the following 
requirements in the very same section: 
- the occupying power must be in a position to substitute its 
own authority for that of the occupied authorities, which must 
have been rendered incapable of functioning publicly; 
- the enemy’s forces have surrendered, been defeated or 
withdrawn. . . . ; 
. . . . 
- a temporary administration has been established over the 
territory; 
- the occupying power has issued and enforced directions to 
the civilian population.175 
 
 173. Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 217 (Mar. 31, 
2003). 
 174. Id. ¶ 217; see also U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 
139 (1956) (“It follows from the definition that belligerent occupation must be 
both actual and effective, that is, the organized resistance must have been 
overcome and the force in possession must have taken measures to establish its 
authority.”). 
 175. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ¶ 217. 
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Taken in the aggregate, the “capacity to send troops within a 
reasonable time” and the above terms may be combined to suggest 
the existence of “effective control,” but each clause cannot 
individually be considered to make that determination. This is further 
reinforced by paragraph 218 which states that “[th]e law of 
occupation only applies to those areas actually controlled by the 
occupying power and ceases to apply where the occupying power no 
longer exercises an actual authority over the occupied area.”176  
The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) reaffirmed that position 
in the 2005 case of Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda.177 The 
ICJ held: 
In order to reach a conclusion as to whether a State . . . is an 
“occupying Power” . . . the Court must examine whether 
there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the said 
authority was in fact established and exercised by the 
intervening State in the areas in question. In the present case 
the Court will need to satisfy itself that the Ugandan armed 
forces in the DRC were not only stationed in particular 
locations but also that they had substituted their own 
authority for that of the Congolese Government.178 
Stressing the necessity of actual authority as opposed to potential 
authority, the court’s decision supports the assertion that Israel’s 
“ability” to exercise power over Gaza fails both the second part of 
the “effective control” test which requires that the authority has been 
established and can be exercised, and the third part of the test which 
requires substitution of the existing government by the authority of 
the occupier. 
The ability to exercise power, by itself, does not give rise to 
“effective control.” For the sake of argument, although it is 
theoretically possible for South Africa to swiftly send its military 
into Lesotho, or for the United States to exert military influence over 
Canada or Mexico, or for larger European countries like France or 
Germany to overtake smaller ones like Luxembourg, Belgium or the 
Netherlands, the mere ability to do so is not necessarily indicative of 
 
 176. Id. ¶ 218 (emphasis added). 
 177. Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Congo v. Uganda), 116 I.C.J. 
2005 (Dec. 19). 
 178. Id. ¶ 173. 
960 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:915 
“effective control.” However, it would be doubtful that if Lesotho 
were posing the same security threats to South Africa that Gaza is 
posing to Israel, or if Canada were militarily hostile to the United 
States, or if small European countries were arming to challenge 
larger ones, the stronger states would allow those threats to become 
real dangers. While the potential to use force to control the territories 
may be present, only the actual use of force to exclude the 
governments of the other states can amount to an occupation. The 
same principle would apply to Israel’s ability to use force against 
Gaza. 
Furthermore, the exercise of ‘some’ power does not give rise to an 
occupation. The Hague Regulations are triggered when the invader’s 
functional control on the ground outruns the existing authority’s 
formal control over the territory. The provisions define an occupier 
as possessing actual control that is adverse to the territory’s official 
legal status.179 The language of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, 
which states that “[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in 
fact passed into the hands of the occupant,” indicates that the invader 
must have a monopoly or near-monopoly on the use of force, as well 
as the ability to govern the civilian population.180  
All other things being equal, Hamas, as the dominant political 
party of the Palestinian Authority and the governmental authority in 
Gaza since its takeover in June 2007, has a far greater “ability” to 
exercise control over Gaza than Israel does.181 Israel’s strike against 
Gaza in the winter of 2009 demonstrates that while Israel can cause 
damage to Hamas, that damage will not necessarily (and, in fact, did 
not) upend or displace Hamas’s administration, either militarily or 
politically.182 In addition, if there were ever an airtight case that 
Israel does not have any real ability to rule over Gaza, it would be 
evidenced by the fact that after Hamas won control over the 
Palestinian Authority and took command of Gaza in 2007, Hamas 
 
 179. Hague Regulations, supra note 27, arts. 42-43, 45. 
 180. Id. art. 43. 
 181. See Ethan Bronner, Israel Speeds Withdrawal from Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
19, 2009, at A6 (observing that Hamas’s strength in and control over Gaza grew in 
the wake of Israel’s winter 2009 offensive in the territory). 
 182. See Ethan Bronner, Parsing Gains of Gaza War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 
2009, at A1 (quoting a military official as saying that “Hamas is the dominant 
organization in Gaza”). 
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ejected the Fatah party from the Gaza Strip—an act that Israel did 
not support.183 
The ability or potential to exercise authority over Gaza satisfies no 
part of the “effective control” test. While potential for control may 
demonstrate the possibility of occupation, occupation will only exist 
when there is an actual fulfillment of the three requirements 
comprising “effective control” under international law. 
V. CHANGING THE STATUS OF GAZA 
Since Israel no longer exercises “effective control” over Gaza and 
Gaza is no longer occupied, the obvious question is: “What is the 
status of Gaza?” 
Oslo II, the Wye River Memo, and the Sharm el-Sheikh Memo 
prohibit both parties from declaring a unilateral change of status of 
the Palestinian Territories. Oslo II states in Article XXXI(7): 
“Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status 
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the 
permanent status negotiations.”184 The Wye River and Sharm el-
Sheikh Memoranda both state “Recognizing the necessity to create a 
positive environment for the negotiations, neither side shall initiate 
or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement.”185 
Some scholars have taken this to indicate that Gaza must continue 
to be regarded as occupied despite Israeli withdrawal from the 
territory.186 That assessment is incorrect. The texts of the memoranda 
simply mean that the Palestinian Authority cannot unilaterally 
declare statehood and Israel cannot unilaterally annex Gaza.187 In the 
 
 183. See How Hamas Took Over the Gaza Strip, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2007, 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6748621.stm (last visited Feb. 10, 
2010) (detailing former Fatah strongholds of which Hamas was able to take 
control). 
 184. Oslo II, supra note 24, art. XXXI(7). 
 185. Wye River Memo, supra note 48, art. V; Sharm el-Sheikh Memo, supra 
note 53, art. V. 
 186. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Israel’s Legal Obligations to Gaza After the 
Pullout, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 524, 524 (2006) (arguing that “Israel still occupies 
Gaza for two reasons,” namely that it has “effective control,” and because various 
agreements “prohibit unilateral changes to the legal status of Gaza and the West 
Bank”). 
 187. See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Aff., Israel, the Conflict and Peace: 
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present situation, both Israel and the Palestinian Authority have 
pledged not to unilaterally change the final status of Gaza or the 
West Bank “pending the outcome of the permanent status 
negotiations.”188 However, those terms do not indicate a preclusion 
of the possibility of altering Gaza’s temporary status. 
The agreements between Israel and the PLO firmly establish that 
both parties “view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single 
territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim 
period.”189 However, it may be argued that endowing the Palestinian 
Authority with absolute and uncontested control over part of its 
prospective territory allows it to demonstrate the ability to function 
as a sovereign government at peace with its neighbors, thereby 
assisting it in laying the groundwork for declaring statehood at the 
conclusion of permanent status negotiations. 
A. AN END TO OCCUPATION AND A NEW BEGINNING 
Article VI of the Fourth Geneva Convention describes an 
occupation as ending “one year after the general close of military 
operations” and when the “Occupying Power” no longer “exercises 
the functions of government in [the] territory.”190 However, the 
Fourth Geneva Convention does not provide specific guidelines for 
how that determination is made. 
There are four ways, in principle, that an occupation can end: loss 
of “effective control”; dissolution of the ousted sovereign (a practice 
that is no longer accepted as it is incongruent with the principle of 
self-determination); signing a peace agreement or armistice 
agreement with an ousted sovereign; or “transferring authority to an 
 
Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (Nov. 5, 2003), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/11/Israel+the+Conflic
t+and+Peace-+Answers+to+Frequen+-+2003.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) 
(“The prohibition on unilateral measures was designed to ensure that neither side 
take steps that would change the legal status of [Gaza and the West Bank] (such as 
by annexation or a unilateral declaration of statehood), pending the outcome of 
permanent status negotiations.”). 
 188. Oslo II, supra note 24, art. XXXI(7) (emphasis added); see also Wye River 
Memo, supra note 52, art. V; Sharm el-Sheikh Memo, supra note 53, art. 10. 
 189. Oslo Accords, supra note 23, art. IV. 
 190. Id. 
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indigenous government endorsed by the occupied population through 
referendum and by international recognition.”191  
The signing of a treaty or some other international agreement 
could signify the end to the occupation of Gaza, but an official 
agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in that regard 
would only come at the conclusion of permanent status negotiations. 
Until that comes to pass, and in light of the absence of “effective 
control,” another status is needed for Gaza. To provide a solution to 
the political stalemate in Gaza and to pave the way for the 
establishment of a viable Palestinian state that is at peace with Israel, 
it is imperative that the status be changed. 
Although, as the factual and legal arguments in this article have 
demonstrated, Gaza is no longer effectively controlled by Israel and 
there has been a transfer of governmental authority to the Palestinian 
Authority—which has been accepted as the indigenous government 
of the people—international recognition of the end of occupation of 
Gaza has not been forthcoming. While the absence of effective 
control is legally sufficient to indicate the end of the occupation of 
Gaza, recognition of that end by international legal experts is 
politically important for universal acknowledgement and acceptance 
of Gaza’s changed status and of Israel’s efforts to move the process 
forward. 
B. THE TRANSITION OF GAZA FROM OCCUPIED TO SUI GENERIS 
TERRITORY 
The status of Gaza has often been presented as an “either/or” 
scenario. Either Gaza is occupied by Israel or it is part of a state 
comprised of that territory and the West Bank. Statehood and 
occupation are not mutually exclusive, and there can be many 
alternatives to those choices and those that are presented above. 
Although determining the end of an occupation is not dependent 
upon a formal redefinition, this article recommends that, in the case 
of Gaza, there should be a temporary or intermediate status that 
 
 191. See Eyal Benvenisti, The Law on the Unilateral Termination of 
Occupation, in VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN DES WALTHER-SCHÜCKING-INSTITUTS FÜR 
INTERNATIONALES RECHT AN DER UNIVERSITÄT KIEL (Andreas Zimmermann & 
Thomas Giegerich eds., forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1099&context=taulwps. 
964 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:915 
reflects the absence of occupation after disengagement as well as the 
exercise of Palestinian governance in the territory while awaiting the 
finalization of permanent status negotiations. The status of Gaza 
should be redefined as a “sui generis territory” under the 
governmental control of the Palestinian Authority.  
Sui generis, meaning “of its own kind or class, or unique” in its 
characteristics, is a term of art. In international law, a sui generis 
territory is one that is of its own unique character by virtue of the fact 
that there are no similar scenarios to which it can be compared.192 
Though every territorial situation has some sui generis attributes, 
several unprecedented territorial situations have specifically been 
described as sui generis, such as in Namibia, 193 Kosovo,194 and the 
Russian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,195 though they 
have not had that title assigned to them as their official status. The 
only territory officially referred to by the term “sui generis 
collectivity” is New Caledonia, a French subdivision.196 New 
Caledonia is one of the sixteen Non-Self-Governing territories listed 
in 2002 by the United Nations General Assembly that are not 
considered occupied, but also do not have autonomous status.197 
 
 192. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (5th ed. 1979). 
 193. CARSTEN STAHN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION 103-04 (2008); see also U.N. Transition 
Assistance Group [UNTAG], Nambia-Untag Background, http://secint24.un.org/D 
epts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untagFT.htm (last visited June 21, 2010). 
 194. James Hughes, London Sch. of Econ. & Polt. Sci [LSE], UNDP, The 
Kosovo Precedent? Implications for Frozen Conflicts, Mar. 23, 2007 
http://developmentandtransition.net/index.cfm?module=ActiveWeb&page=WebPa
ge&DocumentID=637 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 195. Embassy of Greece, Wash., D.C., Russian Envoy: Ossetia, Abkhazia ‘sui 
generis’ Cases (Aug. 29, 2008), http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/Content/ 
en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=19&article=24156 (last visited June 21, 2010). 
 196. See LA CONSTITUTION art. 72 (1958) (Fr.) (defining various territorial 
communities); see also Regions and Territories: New Caledonia, BBC, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/3921323.stm (last visited 
June 21, 2010) (providing background on New Caledonia). 
 197. See U.N., Non-Self-Governing Territories Listed by General Assembly in 
2002, http://www.un.org/depts/dpi/decolonization/trust3.htm (last visited June 21, 
2010) (listing the sixteen Non-Self-Governing Territories as: Western Sahara, 
Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, 
Montserrat, St. Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands, 
Gibraltar, American Samoa, Guam, New Caledonia, Pitcairn, and Tokelau). 
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It had long been the official position of the Israeli government, 
supported by Israeli court decisions, that the situation in the 
Palestinian Territories was sui generis198 because it has never been 
the territory of a High Contracting Party199 pursuant to Article 2(2) of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention.200 This notion was first presented to 
legitimize Israeli retention of at least part of the territories conquered 
after the Six-Day War by asserting that since the territory was not a 
state, it was not subject to the international law of occupation and 
therefore was not “occupied” but rather “disputed” or 
“administered.” Later Israeli Supreme Court decisions rejected this 
idea and, in fact, leaned in the direction of conceding that Israel’s 
relationship with the territories to be a belligerent occupancy.201 
However, those later decisions were rendered before Israel’s 2005 
disengagement from Gaza. The situation on the ground has shifted 
and in the absence of “effective control,” classification as a 
belligerent occupancy no longer applies. Distinct from earlier 
attempts to classify Gaza as not occupied, a new legal status—sui 
generis territory—is now appropriate for Gaza since Israel does not 
exercise “effective control” over the territory. Gaza remains a unique 
international territory whose temporary or intermediate status should 
be recharacterized as a sui generis territory while its permanent 
status is pending. 
CONCLUSION 
Recognizing the need for a political solution to the Israeli and 
Palestinian conflict while also recognizing Israel’s security concerns, 
the Israeli government withdrew all military and civilian personnel 
 
 198. JOHN DUGARD, ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WEST BANK AND 
THE GAZA STRIP 464-65 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992); see also, LISA HAJJAR, 
COURTING CONFLICT 54 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005) (1961) (“Israel was not 
‘occupying’ but ‘administering’ these ‘disputed’ areas, whose legal status was sui 
generis.”). 
 199. See Quigley, supra note 60, at 728 (explaining that sovereignty over Gaza 
and the West Bank was not clearly established when Israel’s occupation began). 
 200. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art. 2 (“In addition to the 
provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, the present Convention shall 
apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.”) 
 201. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (citing the applicable case law 
from the Israeli Supreme Court). 
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from Gaza in September 2005 with the intent to end the occupation 
and move toward a resolution of the conflict. By applying the Hague 
Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and the precedent of the 
Hostages Case to the situation in Gaza (after Israel’s 
disengagement), Gaza can no longer be considered occupied and 
under “effective control,” since “effective control,” as understood in 
the context of the laws of occupation, does not apply to the actions of 
Israel in relation to Gaza.202  
Although Israel’s loss of “effective control” over Gaza is legally 
sufficient to indicate that the occupation of the territory has ended, 
the international community has been reluctant to accept the change 
in status. While it is not legally necessary to obtain international 
recognition of Israel’s position, it is politically important for the 
absence of occupation to be acknowledged by international legal 
experts so that Israel can no longer be held to the more stringent 
legal requirements of an occupier and to lend greater legitimacy to 
Israel’s acts of self-defense.  
There are many who say that the Oslo Agreements are dead, that 
permanent status negotiations are elusive, that a two-state solution 
will never happen, and that peace will not come to the region. At this 
point, the truth of those assertions is difficult to determine. However, 
what is clear is that several of the provisions of the Oslo Accords, 
Oslo II, and other agreements do apply. Going forward, it is 
imperative that Israel’s actions in relation to Gaza be understood as 
grounded in their international legal rights, and based on 
international law pursuant to contracts signed between Israel and the 
Palestinians. 
Redefining Gaza’s status from an “occupied territory” to a “sui 
generis territory” in order to reflect the absence of “effective control” 
would be an affirmative step towards statehood for the Palestinian 
people and would provide greater security for the people of Israel. 
The international community has generally taken a particular interest 
in resolving the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Acknowledging the shift 
in Gaza’s legal status would be a positive political gesture that would 
demonstrate an appreciation for Israel’s efforts to end its occupation 
 
 202. See supra Part IV (dismantling arguments that Israel has effective control 
over Gaza). 
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of Gaza and which may ultimately help provide a stabilizing force in 
the Middle East. 
 
 
